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ABSTRACT 
 
In 2008 India imported 128.15 million metric tons of crude, constituting 75% of its total 
petroleum consumption for that year.  By 2025 it will be importing 90% of its petroleum 
(UNESCAP 2009).  In an effort to increase its energy security and independence, the 
Government of India in October of 2007 set a 20% ethanol blend target for gasoline fuel to be 
met by 2017.  In India, the vast majority of ethanol is produced from sugarcane molasses, a by-
product of sugar.  In the future it may also be produced directly from sugarcane juice.   The 
main objective of this study is to develop an economic framework to determine the 
implications of the 2017 blend mandate for India’s food and energy security and allocation of 
land and water between food and fuel production.   This is accomplished through the 
development of a static, spatial, multi-market economic model.  The model is a partial 
equilibrium model which includes eight markets for agricultural commodities: wheat, rice, 
sorghum, corn, groundnut, rapeseed, cotton, and soybean in addition to the markets for sugar, 
alcohol and fuel (gasoline and biofuel).    I evaluate the economically optimal allocation of land 
for sugarcane in the primary agricultural states of India.  I analyze the implications of biofuel 
production for food prices and regional land use decisions between sugarcane and competing 
crops.  I also examine the impacts of this biofuel policy on India’s export and import balance 
and test the sensitivity of my results to world market conditions by assuming multiple trade 
scenarios.  Additionally I examine the potential for improved irrigation efficiency to lessen the 
trade-off of irrigation water for food crops versus fuel crops. 
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 If the Government of India hopes to successfully reach their ethanol blend goal for 2017 
with minimum negative side effects on the rest of its economy, my model results suggest that it 
will need to convert its ethanol industry from one dependent solely on sugarcane molasses to 
one based primarily on sugarcane juice.   My results also suggest that negative impacts on the 
domestic sugar and alcohol industry and agricultural markets are unavoidable.  However these 
impacts can be lessened through investment in crop production technology and agricultural 
infrastructure to improve yields and efficiency of irrigation systems to increase availability of 
water or reduce water requirements for irrigated crop production. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
Governments around the globe have become increasingly interested in alternative fuel 
sources due to growing concerns over energy security brought on by diminishing fossil fuel 
reserves, instability in the Middle East and the recent volatility of crude oil prices.  One 
particularly pressing cause for concern is the widening gap between demand and supply of 
fossil fuel based energy resources.  Energy use is expected to dramatically increase in the near 
future.  The US Energy Information Administration projects a 50% rise in worldwide marketed 
energy consumption between 2005 and 2030.  This increase will be particularly extreme in the 
non-OECD or developing world countries where energy consumption is expected to increase by 
85%; corresponding to 40.1% of world consumption in 2005 (EIA 2008).  Another factor 
prompting policymakers to seek alternative forms of energy that produce fewer greenhouse 
gas emissions than fossil fuels is the growing threat of global climate change.  Biofuels 
potentially represent a more environmentally friendly alternative to fossil fuels as they produce 
fewer greenhouse gas emissions when burned. 
The expansion of biofuel production may also have negative social and environmental 
impacts.  One obvious potential problem that growing greater quantities of fuel crops for 
biofuel feedstock may create is competition with food crops for land, water and other 
agricultural inputs.   This could prove particularly problematic for the poor because of shortages 
of food and rising food prices which may result.  Another concern raised by biofuels is that they 
may actually be worse for the environment than fossil fuels.  There remains ambiguity about 
whether or not biofuels actually produce fewer greenhouse gas emissions than their fossil fuel 
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equivalents after including the effects of indirect land use changes induced by the higher food 
prices caused when land is diverted to biofuel production .  Specifically, the greenhouse gas 
savings from cleaner fossil fuels may be negated by the carbon released when forests and 
marginal lands are converted to crop production when food prices go up. 
Biofuels lead to tradeoffs between food, fodder and fuel security.  Recent spikes in food 
prices have been taking a toll on developing countries and the poor around the world.  
According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the UN, food prices rose by close 
to 40% in 2007 (FAO 2008).  This upward trend in food prices stems primarily from a rapid 
growth in demand for food, particularly meat and milk in the developing world combined with a 
much slower growth in food supply resulting from underinvestment in agricultural research and 
rural infrastructure and diminishing natural resources (Rosegrant 2008).  However, the rapid 
expansion of the biofuel industry may also be a significant contributing factor.  A study by the 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) approximates the contribution of biofuel 
demand to the grain price increases from 2000 to 2007 by comparing prices of food crops 
serving as biofuel feedstock from 2000 to 2007, with a scenario where biofuel growth rate was 
similar to that in 1999-2000.  The study estimated that biofuel demand during the period 
between 2000 and 2007 accounted for 30% of the increase in world grain prices (Rosegrant 
2008).   
The environmental benefits of biofuels through reduced greenhouse gas emissions are 
also subject to debate.  Although biofuels do release fewer emissions than their fossil fuel 
equivalents when burned, over their entire lifecycle biofuels may or may not result in fewer 
GHG emissions than their fossil fuel counterparts depending on the type of land used for 
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growing the feedstock and the agricultural practices used in the feedstock cultivation and 
indirect land use changes due to increases in food prices.  (Fargione et al. 2008). 
Biofuels have become particularly appealing to developing countries because of their 
potential to stimulate economic development in rural areas and alleviate poverty through the 
creation of employment opportunities and increased income in the agricultural sector.  Biofuel 
production tends to be labor intensive and thus a good generator of rural employment.  In 
addition, the production of biofuels requires investment in roads and other forms of rural and 
transport infrastructure which will have a “crowd in” effect by encouraging other investments 
(Hausmann 2007).  Many developing countries have therefore begun to explore biofuel policies 
of their own.  China for example has announced a biofuel blend target of 15% for all 
transportation fuels by 2020 (Dong 2007).  India has implemented a 5% ethanol blend mandate 
for gasoline fuel, scheduled to be increased to 20% by 2017.  By expanding sugarcane ethanol 
production, the Government of India hopes to increase domestic food and energy security, 
accelerate rural development and reduce carbon emissions (GOI 2003). 
India’s interest in improving its energy security stems from its rapidly growing 
dependence on foreign oil.  India’s economy is growing at a rate of 7% per year, making it the 
second fastest growing economy in the world.  The country is projected to become the third 
largest consumer of transportation fuel in 2020, after the USA and China (Kiuru, 2002).  In 2008 
India imported 128.15 million metric tons of crude oil valued at $75.7 billion, constituting 75% 
of its total petroleum consumption for that year.  By 2025 it will be importing 90% of its 
petroleum (UNESCAP 2009).  India’s increasing dependence on foreign energy sources will 
make the country increasingly vulnerable to external price shocks and supply distortions.  These 
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threats are made especially real by the fact that India imports 75 percent of its crude oil needs 
from OPEC countries who have the monopoly power to cut supply and raise prices at any time 
(UNESCAP 2009). 
Another reason for India to take an interest in a domestic biofuels industry is its 
potential to accelerate rural development.  As in most developing countries, the majority of 
India’s labor force works in the agricultural sector, therefore in India there is particularly high 
potential for biofuels to raise incomes, provide employment, and contribute to rural 
development.   This combined with India’s aforementioned concerns over energy security has 
led the Government of India recently to develop a keen interest in encouraging the expansion 
of a domestic biofuels industry.  In 2003 they launched the first phase of their biofuels program 
in which 5% blending of ethanol in gasoline was mandated in certain areas of nine major 
sugarcane growing states and four union territories.  In October of 2007, the Cabinet 
Committee on Economic Affairs (CCEA) extended the 5% blend mandate to the rest of the 
country (with the exception of the state of Jammu and Kashmir, the North-Eastern states and 
Island Territories) and announced that 10% blending would be optional between October 2007 
and October 2008 and would become mandatory after October 2008 (Raju and Shinoj 2009).  
Thus far, India has failed to meet its ethanol blend targets by a large margin.  In 2009 the Indian 
sugar industry estimated that 680 million liters of ethanol would be needed to meet just a 5% 
blend but only 585 million liters of ethanol were produced that year (Economic Times 2009b).   
In December of 2009 the Government of India set an official target of at least 20% blending of 
ethanol with gasoline by 2017 (The Economic Times 2009a). 
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The implementation of the mandate in India raises a number of concerns, such as the 
resulting reallocation of land and its implication for food prices,  the availability of sufficient 
feedstock to meet the mandate, and the impacts on trade of agricultural commodities such as 
rice, wheat and sugar.  One of the key questions this study seeks to answer is how agricultural 
land can be reallocated most efficiently in response to the 2017 mandate.  India’s states vary 
greatly in terms of their suitability for agriculture.   
Another question raised by the 2017 20% blend mandate is whether there will be 
enough feedstock to meet the requirement.  The primary feedstock for bio-ethanol in India is 
sugarcane molasses.   Sugarcane requires prime agricultural land, fertilizer and large quantities 
of irrigation water.  Expansion of sugarcane production for biofuels in India will therefore most 
likely increase competition for agricultural inputs.  As discussed above, if biofuel crops compete 
with food crops for key agricultural inputs they will begin to impact food prices.   In addition, as 
India’s biofuel program expands, so too will the amount of land devoted to sugarcane 
cultivation.  This may lead to a number of environmental problems such as deforestation, land 
degradation, water pollution and water scarcity (FAO 2008).   In October of 2007 a ban on 
direct ethanol production from sugarcane juice was put in place as an attempt to prevent direct 
competition with sugar (Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs 2007).  However, few 
distilleries capable of utilizing sugarcane juice as ethanol feedstock exist thus far.  Therefore, 
unless the Government of India can come up with a way to encourage construction of hundreds 
of new distilleries capable of producing ethanol from sugarcane before 2017, most of the 
mandate will need to be met with molasses based ethanol.  This will be difficult to accomplish 
considering that current projections for gasoline demand in 2017 (22.2 billion liters) would 
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place the mandated ethanol quantity at around 4.5 billion liters (GOI 2003).  This would require 
19.8 million MT of molasses to be produced whereas in 2006, India produced a total of 8.6 
million MT of molasses.  Even if sufficient quantities of molasses were to be produced, the 
domestic alcohol industry would be severely affected due to the fact that molasses is the sole 
raw material for alcohol in India (AIDA 2006).  Currently, according to national legislation, 70% 
of molasses must be allocated to industrial and potable alcohol production leaving only 30% for 
other uses including fuel ethanol (Raju and Shinoj 2009).  It is evident that in order to meet the 
2017 blend mandate, India will need to utilize at least some sugarcane juice as feedstock in 
addition to the molasses available from sugar production.   The diversion of sugarcane from 
sugar production to biofuels may result in a shortage of sugar, resulting in an increase in the 
price of sugar. 
Another key concern created by the implementation of the 2017 blend mandate is its 
potential impacts on India’s agricultural commodity trade balance.  India in recent years has 
been a net exporter of rice.  For the most part it also is an exporter of wheat and sugar but has 
become an importer of both during shortage years (GOI 2008a).  Expansion of sugarcane 
production to meet a 20% blend mandate would likely reduce land available to rice and wheat 
which would lead to a fall in their production.  Rice and wheat exports would decrease and if 
the fall in production were drastic enough, India may need to switch to importing rice and 
wheat.  If molasses remains the main source of ethanol feedstock, sugar production will need 
to increase significantly.  This will in turn lead to a large increase in sugar exports at reduced 
export prices, which would negatively impact sugar producers in India and internationally.  On 
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the other hand, sugar production would decrease if a large proportion of the ethanol is made 
with sugarcane juice and sugar exports would decrease as well. 
 
The main objective of this study is to develop an economic framework to analyze the 
implications of a 20% ethanol blend mandate for gasoline fuel in 2017 for India’s food and 
energy security and extent of diversion of land and water from food to fuel production.  I 
evaluate the economically optimal allocation of land and water for sugarcane amongst the 
primary agricultural states of India given a binding 20% ethanol blend mandate along with 
constraints on land and water availability and demand for food crops.  I analyze the implications 
of biofuel production for food prices and regional land use decisions between sugarcane and 
competing crops and for irrigation water use.  I also examine the impacts of this biofuel policy 
on India’s export and import balance and test the sensitivity of my results to world market 
conditions by assuming multiple trade scenarios.  Additionally I examine the potential for 
improved irrigation efficiency to lessen the trade-off of irrigation water for food crops versus 
fuel crops. 
 
In January 2003, the Government of India initiated the Ethanol Blended Petrol Program 
(EBPP). The initial policy consisted of a 5% ethanol blend mandate for gasoline in 9 of the 29 
states and 4 of the 6 union territories of India.  However, that same year saw a nation-wide 
sugarcane shortage which led to extraordinarily high alcohol and ethanol prices.  As a result, by 
the fall of 2004 production of ethanol fell practically to zero and the Government of India was 
forced to repeal the blend mandate (USDA 2006).   In October of 2007, the Cabinet Committee 
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on Economic Affairs (CCEA) decided to remove the ban on direct ethanol production from 
sugarcane juice.  The policy was initially put in place as an attempt to prevent direct 
competition between ethanol and sugar (GOI 2007).  The October 2007 committee meeting 
also enacted a country-wide Minimum Purchase Price for ex-factory ethanol of Rs. 21.5/litre, 
good until October 2010.  In December of 2009 the Government of India approved a National 
Policy on Biofuels which sets an official target of at least 20% blending of ethanol with gasoline 
by 2017 (The Economic Times 2009a).   
 
Although Brazil produces the most sugarcane, India is the world’s number one producer 
of sugar.  60% of India’s sugar is produced in two states: Maharashtra and Uttar Pradesh and 
almost all the rest is produced in Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh.  Most of 
the domestic sugar demand in India is met by domestic production but in deficit years it 
imports sugar and exports when there is a surplus.  The majority of sugarcane grown in India is 
used by sugar mills to produce sugar and its two main by-products, molasses and bagasse.  
Currently 70-80% of harvested sugarcane is used by regulated mills to produce sugar.  The 
other 20-30% is used for the production of alternate sweeteners: gur and khandsari and for 
seeds (Raju et al 2009).   The only sugarcane based product that produces molasses as a 
byproduct however is standard sugar.  Sugar extraction rates from sugarcane in India average 
around 10.5% compared to about 14% for Brazil (Pursell 2007). 
 
The process of producing ethanol through fermentation has been used by cultures 
around the world since prehistoric times.  Saccharomyces cerevisiae yeast is added to a sweet 
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solution such as a fruit juice or as in the case of the Indian alcohol industry, sugarcane 
molasses.    The yeast metabolizes the sugars in the solution into ethanol and carbon dioxide.  
However, because the ethanol is toxic and the yeast can survive no more than a 10% ethanol 
concentration, in order to purify the ethanol any further, a distillation method must be used.  
This produces ethanol having 95% purity (GOI 2003).   
The Indian alcohol industry came into existence in the 1930’s as a means of dealing with 
the excess molasses being produced by the newly established sugar industry.  At that time, the 
market for molasses was non-existent and it was in fact costly to sugar mills to dispose of the 
molasses by-product.  The state governments of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar recommended the 
establishment of distilleries for the production of molasses based alcohol.  The alcohol 
produced in India, known as rectified spirit is manufactured almost exclusively from sugarcane 
molasses (AIDA 2006).   Alcohol  is originally manufactured with a water content of 5-7% so 
before it can be used for blending with gasoline it must first be dehydrated to create anhydrous 
ethanol, which is 99.5% ethanol (Kumar and Agrawal 2003).     
 
One of the key problems this study seeks to shed light on is the optimal spatial 
distribution of sugarcane for biofuel production throughout India.  I examine this problem using 
a mathematical model considering a spatial disaggregation at a state level, determining 
efficiency in terms of costs, yields and land and water use, all of which vary considerably across 
the 15 states included in my model.  The model developed for this study finds the economically 
optimal distribution by allocating crop land to each region in such a way as to maximize 
national level social surplus.   
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The current regional land use pattern is the result of not only the bio-geographical 
characteristics of each state but also by government policies that influence incentives for 
agricultural production.  Crop specific policies include the minimum support price, the state 
advisory prices, the levy rates for crop procurement that affect the land allocation decisions 
among crops as well as the profitability of biofuel production.  In addition, political influence 
has contributed to determining the location of sugar mills throughout India which in turn 
determines the distribution of sugarcane production. 
The Government of India enforces fixed minimum support prices (MSP’s) for a set of 25 
agricultural commodities in order to ensure remunerative prices for farmers and to encourage 
greater investment into agricultural production (GOI 2010).  In the case of sugarcane, not only 
does the central government impose its minimum support price, the individual state 
governments all have their own say about the minimum price of sugarcane.  The state 
governments enforce their own state advised prices (SAP) which tend to be significantly higher 
than the SMP (FAO 1997).  This policy can of course significantly distort the spatial distribution 
of sugarcane acreage by encouraging cultivation in certain states over others because of 
artificially imposed guarantees of higher prices. 
The government subsidizes key inputs such as fertilizer, electricity and irrigation water.  
These subsidy rates differ by state and by crop (depending on the intensity with which a crop 
uses a particular input) and will influence the profitability of alternative crops and thus the 
cropping pattern across states.  Inputs subsidized by the Indian government consist of fertilizer, 
credit, irrigation and electricity.   Subsidies on fertilizers are the largest explicit subsidies of any 
kind in the central government budget.  In the year 1999-2000 fertilizer subsidies totaled Rs.132 
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billion, which represented 0.75% of GDP for that year (Gulati and Kelley 1999).  Credit subsidies, 
or interest subsidies are the difference between commercial interest rates and the rates 
farmers receive plus defaulted loans to farmers.  In India, subsidies on the provision of irrigation 
water fall under two categories: subsidies on canal water and subsidies on power used for 
drawing up groundwater.   Pricing of canal water falls to the individual state governments and 
therefore varies widely across states.  Some states such as Punjab provide irrigation water from 
canals free of charge but in most states the price of water is based on crop area and growing 
season (Gulati and Kelley 1999).  Power is subsidized in India through cross-subsidization of the 
lowered costs faced by agricultural and domestic consumers by overcharging industrial and 
commercial power consumers with prices that are higher than the cost of supply (Gulati and 
Kelley 1999).  Because input subsidies in India differ both across states and across crops (due to 
the differences in intensity with which a particular crop uses a particular input) they change the 
profitability of different crops in a given state, thereby distorting the national level land use 
pattern. 
Today the level of customs duties on cereals is between 60% and 80%.   After 2002, 
almost all basic food commodities were freed from export restrictions (Hoda and Sekhar 2007).  
India has a 150% tariff on imports of sugar and imports of sugarcane are subject to a 30% tariff.  
(Pursell 2007).  In recent years India has been a net exporter of rice.  For the most part it is also 
an exporter of wheat and sugar but has become an importer of both during shortage years (GOI 
2008a). 
Of all the major agricultural industries worldwide, sugar faces the most government 
interventions.  In this respect India is no exception.  All sugar mills must maintain a spacing of at 
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least 15km.  They are subject to “catchment area” regulations which require sugar mills to buy 
all sugarcane delivered to them by the farmers in a designated area around the mill at a price 
no lower than that set by either the central or state government.   The individual state 
governments also impose a levy on output of crops and control the supply and distribution of 
sugarcane within their boundaries (FAO 1997).   
The Indian sugar market follows a two-tiered pricing system.  Every month the 
government fixes the quota of sugar each producer is allowed to sell on the open market.  
Sugar mills are required to supply a fixed proportion (10% since 2002) of their output, known as 
“levy sugar” to the Ministry of Food and Civil Supplies at a government controlled low price.  
Levy sugar is then sold to consumers throughout the country at a uniform, issue price set by the 
central government. (FAO 1997)  Levy sugar sales are limited to Below Poverty Level (BPL) 
families.  The other 90% of sugar output is free to be sold in the private market.  This study 
does not take into account the levy sugar system.  If it were to be accounted for, levies would 
act as a disincentive to sugar producers to increase production as they lower producer revenue. 
Molasses is a co-product of sugarcane production and is the main source of ethanol in 
India.  The yield of molasses from crushed sugarcane ranges from 4 to 4.5% (Indian Sugar Mills 
Association 2008).  The Indian Government dictates the proportion of molasses that may be 
used for the production of alcohol versus alternative end products.  The current policy allocates 
70% of molasses to alcohol production which leaves 30% for animal feed or other uses such as 
fuel ethanol (Raju et al 2009).  This policy, were it to remain in place in the future would not 
leave much feedstock available for fuel ethanol production. 
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Another set of government policies which has influenced the regional distribution of 
sugarcane production in India is the special status accorded to sugar cooperatives, particularly 
in the state of Maharashtra.  The Maharashtra sugar cooperatives have had considerable power 
since the 1950s when the state government granted industrial licenses to set up sugar mills 
solely to agricultural cooperatives.  This is particularly significant because sugarcane is usually 
grown within a short distance from a mill as it would not be economically viable to produce in a 
region where there are no mills due to the cost of long distance transportation.  As a result, the 
distribution of sugarcane fields throughout India is constrained by the spatial distribution of 
sugar mills.  The post-independence government of Maharashtra has been heavily influenced 
by the interests of sugar cooperatives.  As a result, the state government has traditionally acted 
as stakeholder and supporter of the sugar industry through its regulation of the agricultural 
sector (Lalvani 2009). 
The myriad government interventions described above, namely input and output 
subsidies, levies on rice and sugarcane and price controls all cause a divergence between the 
private costs of biofuel production and its social costs.  I do not take into account these policy 
distortions in my model because I lack sufficient state level data to accurately model all of the 
relevant policies.    
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Tables 
 
Table 1.1: Rice Statistics (2004) 
 
 State 
Yield non 
(MT) 
Yield irr 
(MT) 
Acreage 
(1000 ha) % Irrigated 
Land  
Availability 
(1000 ha) 
Water 
Availability 
(Billion 
Liters) 
Costs non 
(Rs/MT) 
Costs irr 
(Rs/MT) 
Andhra 
Pradesh 1.74 3.18 3090.00 0.95 7573.00 381.32 46.04 28.08 
Bihar 0.63 0.92 3120.00 0.55 5942.00 181.77 46.63 35.24 
Haryana 2.50 2.94 1030.00 1.00 4918.00 162.39 33.52 37.29 
Karnataka 1.72 3.12 1310.00 0.71 5886.00 156.76 73.57 43.19 
Maharashtra 1.48 1.28 1520.00 0.28 13196.00 127.81 31.52 31.36 
Punjab 2.29 3.95 2650.00 0.99 6944.00 223.94 26.68 21.02 
TamilNadu 1.85 2.77 1870.00 0.93 3421.00 239.95 59.46 43.78 
Uttar 
Pradesh 1.48 1.92 5340.00 0.70 18335.00 453.58 31.52 31.36 
Assam 1.38 2.33 2380.00 0.08 2720.00 13.39 20.15 11.28 
Chattisgarh 0.97 1.66 3750.00 0.29 4088.00 53.57 45.53 27.83 
Gujarat 1.22 2.24 690.00 0.58 6487.00 111.32 86.52 50.61 
Madhya 
Pradesh 0.64 1.31 1620.00 0.12 13330.00 121.05 96.19 50.61 
Orissa 1.20 1.77 4470.00 0.43 4947.00 91.74 43.17 30.65 
Rajasthan 0.24 1.07 101.00 0.58 8757.00 126.11 208.85 50.61 
West Bengal 2.30 2.83 5780.00 0.51 6713.00 214.70 36.30 35.35 
 
Source: Agricultural Statistics at a Glance2006 Ministry of Agriculture GOI http://dacnet.nic.in/eands/At_A_Glance/pcrops.html 
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Table 1.2: Wheat Statistics (2004) 
 
 State 
Yield non 
(MT) 
Yield irr 
(MT) 
Acreage 
(1000 ha) 
% 
Irrigated 
Land  
Availability 
(1000 ha) 
Water 
Availability 
(Billion 
Liters) 
Costs 
non 
(Rs/MT) 
Costs 
irr 
(Rs/MT) 
AndhraPradesh 0.33 1.16 9.00 0.50 7573.00 381.32 101.11 39.77 
Bihar 1.27 1.64 2030.00 0.93 5942.00 181.77 47.77 39.59 
Haryana 1.92 3.92 2320.00 0.99 4918.00 162.39 54.35 29.64 
Karnataka 0.33 1.16 240.00 0.50 5886.00 156.76 101.11 39.77 
Maharashtra 0.71 1.76 760.00 0.61 13196.00 127.81 70.50 39.77 
Punjab 1.94 4.27 3480.00 0.98 6944.00 223.94 58.84 25.90 
TamilNadu 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3421.00 239.95     
UttarPradesh 1.96 2.52 9000.00 0.97 18335.00 453.58 68.17 39.77 
Assam 1.07 0.00 60.00 0.00 2720.00 13.39 57.87 60.73 
Chattisgarh 1.04 2.19 99.00 0.61 4088.00 53.57 87.25 61.09 
Gujarat 0.49 2.77 730.00 0.88 6487.00 111.32 137.17 34.85 
MadhyaPradesh 0.94 1.95 4140.00 0.78 13330.00 121.05 52.56 35.83 
Orissa 0.00 2.10 16.00 1.00 4947.00 91.74 82.38 60.73 
Rajasthan 1.30 2.86 2010.00 0.99 8757.00 126.11 44.24 28.45 
West Bengal 1.61 2.23 400.00 0.80 6713.00 214.70 62.96 60.73 
 
Source: Agricultural Statistics at a Glance2006 Ministry of Agriculture GOI http://dacnet.nic.in/eands/At_A_Glance/pcrops.html 
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Table 1.3: Sugarcane Statistics (2004) 
 
 State 
Yield non 
(MT) 
Yield irr 
(MT) 
Acreage 
(1000 ha) 
% 
Irrigated 
Land  
Availability 
(1000 ha) 
Water 
Availability 
(Billion 
Liters) 
Costs 
non 
(Rs/MT) 
Costs 
irr 
(Rs/MT) 
AndhraPradesh 48.13 77.00 210.00 0.93 7573.00 381.32 6.35 4.40 
Bihar 38.11 43.35 100.00 0.26 5942.00 181.77 2.29 2.61 
Haryana 29.14 62.33 130.00 0.99 4918.00 162.39 4.55 2.55 
Karnataka   80.20 170.00 1.00 5886.00 156.76 4.24 3.63 
Maharashtra   63.19 320.00 1.00 13196.00 127.81 6.47 5.01 
Punjab 43.27 60.73 90.00 0.97 6944.00 223.94 4.55 2.55 
TamilNadu   100.85 230.00 1.00 3421.00 239.95     
UttarPradesh 30.08 64.33 1950.00 0.90 18335.00 453.58 2.29 2.61 
Assam 36.98   20.00 0.00 2720.00 13.39 6.47 5.01 
Chattisgarh   55.84 12.00 1.00 4088.00 53.57 6.47 5.01 
Gujarat   74.07 200.00 1.00 6487.00 111.32 6.47 5.01 
MadhyaPradesh 22.60 40.97 50.00 1.00 13330.00 121.05 6.47 5.01 
Orissa   55.84 20.00 1.00 4947.00 91.74 6.47 5.01 
Rajasthan   74.07 6.00 1.00 8757.00 126.11 6.47 5.01 
West Bengal 62.92 69.37 20.00 0.51 6713.00 214.70 6.47 5.01 
 
Source: Agricultural Statistics at a Glance2006 Ministry of Agriculture GOI http://dacnet.nic.in/eands/At_A_Glance/pcrops.html 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Previous Literature 
Biofuel quantity mandates such as the one currently being implemented in India create 
a market such that the demand for biofuels is no longer tied to market forces in the food and 
energy markets.  The environmental benefits of a mandate policy however depend on whether 
or not it leads to a replacement of gasoline with biofuel.  This is a function of the supply 
elasticity of gasoline, the degree of substitutability of ethanol for gasoline and the extent to 
which mandates increase the price of ethanol.   
The US Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) requires that a specific and increasing quantity of 
biofuels be produced every year, peaking at 36 billion gallons of biofuels by 2022.  A small 
number of studies have focused on the economic effects of biofuel quantity mandate policy, in 
particular the US RFS.  Gallagher et al. (2003) calculate that an RFS of an annual output of 5 
billion gallons of ethanol when combined with a ban on the use of MTBE as a fuel additive, by 
2015 will lower gasoline prices by 2% while raising the price of ethanol by 10% relative to 
baseline levels.  Because of the high cost of ethanol and gasoline blended fuel compared to 
pure gasoline, gasoline consumption would fall by far more (0.13 billion barrels) than the 
simultaneous mandated increase in ethanol consumption (0.01 billion barrels).  As a result, 
social welfare (without including environmental benefits) decreases by 6% but emissions of air 
pollutants also decline (in areas using reformulated gasoline).  De Gorter and Just (2007b) 
examine the effects of an ethanol tax credit in the presence of a fuel blend mandate and 
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demonstrate that the tax credit would lower the cost of fuel and lead to an increase in gasoline 
consumption of 0.4% and a reduction in the price of the blended fuel by 2% in 2015.  De Gorter 
and Just (2008) examine the effects of an ethanol tax credit and a reduction in the ethanol 
import tariff in the presence of a fuel blend mandate and show that in the presence of a binding 
blend mandate, reducing the import tariff would only reduce the domestic ethanol prices by 
2.4% but would increase the world price by 21% in 2015.  They also find that eliminating both 
the tariff and the tax credit would make very little difference to fuel prices or consumption.  
Tyner and Taheripour (2008) compare the effects of various biofuel policies and find that the 
cost of the RFS to fuel consumers decreases as the price of crude oil increases (and the gap 
between the cost of ethanol and gasoline decreases) while the cost of the ethanol subsidy to 
the government increases as the price of crude oil increases (and the production of ethanol 
increases).  
Recent studies have used a variety of economic models to simulate the effects of the US 
RFS on land use and agricultural commodity prices.  Ferris and Joshi (2009) use the AGMOD 
econometric model and find that between 2008 and 2017, the RFS mandate can be met by 
projected crop yield improvements and conversion of Conservation Reserve Program and 
pasture land.  They assume zero production of cellulosic ethanol.  English et al. (2008) use the 
POLYSYS model to examine the impact of the RFS mandate, assuming that cellulosic biofuels are 
not yet feasible over the study period (2007-2016).  Their results suggest that the mandate will 
increase corn production throughout the country but most dramatically in the Corn Belt states 
where corn is already most prevalent.  They also conclude that the land use shift towards 
increased corn production will increase use of chemicals and fertilizers and worsen soil erosion 
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and sedimentation problems.  Reilly et al. (2009) use a general equilibrium model known as 
EPPA to examine land use effects of second generation biofuels expansion over a longer time 
span (2015-2100).  They find that the replacement of first generation biofuels with cellulosics 
allows for considerable biofuel expansion without major food price increases.  Because 
cellulosic biofuels would still require large quantities of land, accelerated deforestation may 
result.  Chen et al. (2010) use the BEPAM model to examine the effects of the RFS in 
combination with other biofuel policies on land use and food and fuel prices in the US between 
2007 and 2022.  Their results suggest that the RFS alone will lead to a heavy reliance on corn 
ethanol and therefore a considerable increase in corn acreage and prices.  Combining the RFS 
with the existing subsidies for cellulosic biofuels ($0.27/liter tax credit) however would result in 
a vast majority of the mandate being met by cellulosics rather than corn.  This would decrease 
competition with other crops for land and therefore results in a more moderate increase in 
prices of these crops. 
A few studies have looked at the global impacts of biofuel expansion using international 
level economic models.  Birur et al. (2008) use the GTAP general equilibrium model to examine 
the international land use changes brought on by the combined US and EU biofuel mandates.  
They find that the increases in biofuels demand will cause acreage devoted to livestock, forestry 
and food crops such as wheat and soybean to decrease in the US.  In the EU oilseed acreage will 
expand by 21% while in Brazil sugarcane production will expand into forests.  Hertel et al. 
(2010) also use the GTAP model in their study.  Their results suggest that biofuel mandates in 
the US and the EU will cause crop production to rise around the world and that the land used 
for this increased production will come mostly from pastureland and some from commercial 
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forest.  A study by the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA 2009) uses a 
combination of the FAO/IIASA Agroecological Zone Model and the IIASA Global Food Systems 
Model to examine the relationship between first generation biofuel development policies and 
global food security.  Their results show that the achievement of a 10% biofuel blend in 
transport fuel worldwide is possible but at the cost of a 15% increase in the population at risk of 
hunger.    Msangi et al. (2007) use the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) 
IMPACT model to investigate the effects of developed country biofuel mandates on the 
developing world.  Assuming that biofuel expansion through 2020 consists solely of first 
generation biofuels, or those made from conventional feedstocks, meeting future biofuel blend 
requirements will result in considerable increases in international prices of feedstock crops, 
particularly oilseeds and sugar crops.  In this scenario daily caloric intake in developing 
countries drops by 194 calories and the number of malnourished children in these countries 
increases by 11 million. 
The IIASA (2009) study focuses part of their research on the South Asia region.  They 
find that by 2020, assuming all national blend mandates are met worldwide, South Asia will face 
at least an additional 80 million undernourished people.  Msangi et al. (2007) mention that the 
South Asia region will see a drop in daily caloric intake of more than 100 kcal.  Additionally the 
number of malnourished children will increase by over a million.   Hertel et al. (2010) look at 
impacts on India specifically but only in terms of how it is affected by the biofuel mandates of 
the US and the EU.  They find that India by 2015 will increase cultivation of oilseeds and grains 
but will decrease cultivation of coarse grains and sugarcane.  According to their simulation, the 
only new fuel ethanol demand will come from the US and its biofuel mandate.   All of the 
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increase in sugarcane production required to fuel this new demand will come from Brazil.   
Generally there is a dearth of literature available thus far that models the effects of 
international biofuels expansion on land use and food markets in India.   Additionally, none 
have modeled the effects on India of its own biofuel policies.  This study attempts to fill this 
gap. 
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CHAPTER 3: MODEL 
 
General Description 
 This study seeks to examine the economic effects of meeting ethanol production targets 
for the state level allocation of land among sugarcane and competing crops in India in 2017.  
This is accomplished through the development of a static, spatial, multi-market partial 
equilibrium model which includes 8 primary agricultural commodities: wheat, rice, sorghum, 
corn, groundnut, rapeseed, cotton, and soybean.  In addition, it incorporates the markets for 
three processed commodities derived from sugarcane, namely sugar, alcohol and biofuel.  
Gasoline and biofuel are considered as perfect substitutes in the fuels market, which is driven 
by the demand for transportation.  The supply side of the crop and biofuel markets 
incorporates regional heterogeneity in costs of production, availability of land and water 
resources and crop production methods and yields at the state level.  The model considers 15 
of the most agriculturally productive states in India1
The modeling framework consists of three inter-linked tiers.  The first tier includes 
national markets for gasoline and ethanol.  The consumption of sugarcane ethanol in India is 
driven by the blend mandate for 2017 and is thus derived from the demand for gasoline 
transport fuel which can consist of either petroleum based gasoline or ethanol.  Ethanol can be 
.  Specifically, these states accounted for 
95% of the total foodgrain production in India in 2005.  States were chosen for exhibiting 
production levels accounting for 5% or more of the national total for at least one of the model 
crops.   
                                                 
1 Model States: Andhra Pradesh, Assam,  Bihar,  Chattisgarh, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, 
Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal 
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produced from either sugarcane juice or molasses.  The second tier is made up of markets for 
food crops, sugar and the market for alcohol which competes with ethanol for molasses 
feedstock.  I project the national level demands for sugar, food crops and alcohol for 2017, the 
year for which the target level for the ethanol blend mandate is currently 20%.  The demand 
curves for sugar, agricultural commodities and alcohol are then shifted out by keeping the base 
price and elasticities constant but replacing the base year demand with the 2017 demand 
quantity.   The supply side of the agricultural and fuel markets incorporate state-level 
heterogeneity in costs and yields.  The third tier includes quantity restrictions on regional 
supply of inputs, namely cropland and water available in each state and the demand for 
fertilizer and electricity for agricultural production. 
Demand functions for the 9 crops are specified exogenously given the base year prices, 
quantities and demand elasticities.  The potential for biofuel production shifts the demand 
curve for sugarcane to the right and will raise the price of sugar as well as expand its 
production.  It will induce a shift in cropland acreage from wheat, rice, sorghum, corn, 
groundnut, rapeseed, cotton and soy towards sugarcane.  The costs of production of these 
crops include any input price distortions resulting from existing pricing policies.  The equilibrium 
price of ethanol in the national market, the amount of land actually cultivated and the prices 
and quantities of sugar, alcohol and all primary agricultural commodities are determined 
endogenously by the model.   
Constraints on total land and irrigation water available in each region are included.  
Historically observed allocation of land in each region among the 9 crops are used to constrain 
land use decisions to avoid abrupt and drastic changes in land allocation (McCarl 1982, Önal 
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and Mcarl 1997).  In order to allow increased flexibility in planting behavior which would likely 
be necessary to accommodate a 20% ethanol blend mandate, I generate and use hypothetical 
crop mixes within the model using a method developed by Önal et al. (2009).  Each hypothetical 
mix represents a potential land use pattern and is created using assumed own and cross price 
acreage elasticities and considering a set of price vectors in which prices are varied 
systematically.     
India’s tropical climate allows for multiple plantings of crops on a single plot of land in a 
single year.  My model accounts for this by incorporating data on the growing seasons for each 
crop in each state.  The model allows multiple crops to be grown on a single plot of land over a 
given year but prohibits more than one crop to be grown on that plot of land in a single point in 
time. 
 
Algebraic Model: 
The model developed for this study represents a social planner’s optimal land use decisions for 
15 of the most highly productive agricultural states in India.  The model projects these decisions 
to the year 2017, the deadline proposed by the Government of India for the implementation of 
a 20% ethanol fuel blend mandate.   The objective function used in this model maximizes the 
consumer and producer surplus in the Indian domestic, export and import markets for eight 
major agricultural commodities: rice, wheat, sorghum corn, groundnut, rapeseed, cotton and 
soybeans as well as domestic markets for sugar, alcohol and gasoline fuel.  I assume that 
transportation fuel can be produced from three sources: petroleum based gasoline, sugarcane 
based ethanol or molasses based ethanol.  I also assume that acreage under all other crops, not 
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included in the model is a fixed quantity.  Variables endogenous to the model consist of crop 
acreages and domestic production levels, commodity demands, traded quantities and domestic 
prices and export/import prices of sugar and alcohol.   With the exception of sugar and alcohol, 
the export and import prices of internationally traded commodities are exogenous to the 
model.   
 
The mathematical model is presented below: 
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The first set of terms in the objective function represents benefits (see Appendix A for 
explanations of all abbreviations).  The first term consists of the sum over all grain crops (C) of 
the areas under the crop demand curves.  The second term represents the sum over all 
tradable grain crops of the areas under the export demand curves of these crops.  The third 
term represents the area under the domestic demand curve for sugar.  This is followed by the 
area under the export demand curve for sugar.  The fourth term represent the area under the 
domestic demand curve for alcohol.   The terms that follow represent costs.  The first cost term 
represents the total area under the crop supply curves or the total cultivation costs across all 
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crops and all states.  The second cost term represents the production costs of sugar made from 
sugarcane.  The third and fourth cost terms are the costs of producing ethanol and alcohol from 
sugarcane molasses.  This is followed by the fifth term representing production costs of 
converting crushed sugarcane directly into ethanol.  The sixth and seventh terms represent the 
areas under the import demand curves, first for sugar and next for alcohol.   
 
subject to: 
1. 𝐷𝑐 + 𝐸𝑐 ≤ ∑ 𝑦𝑣,𝑟 ∗ 𝐻𝑣,𝑟𝑟,𝑣 + 𝐼𝑐 for ∀ 𝑐                    Balance Constraint: Crops 
Constraints number 1, 2, 7, 8, 10, 11,  and 12 represent material balance constraints.  Equation 
1 states that the quantity of food crops consumed domestically (Dc) and sold by India to the 
export market (Ec) must not exceed the amount produced domestically combined with the 
amount imported from abroad.   
 
2. 𝐶𝑠 + 𝐶𝑒 ≤ ∑ 𝑦𝑠,𝑟 ∗ 𝐻𝑠,𝑟𝑟                                   Balance Constraint: Sugarcane 
Equation 2 states that the amount of sugarcane consumed in the production of sugar (Cs) and 
ethanol (Ce) for both domestic and international consumption, cannot exceed the amount of 
sugarcane produced domestically (∑ 𝑦𝑠,𝑟 ∗ 𝐻𝑠,𝑟)𝑟 .   
 
3. 𝑁𝑟+𝐼𝑟 ≥ ∑ 𝑙𝑛,𝑡,𝑟 ∗ 𝐻𝑛,𝑟 + ∑ 𝑙𝑖,𝑡,𝑟 ∗ 𝐻𝑖,𝑟𝑖𝑛   for ∀ 𝑟 , t    Land Availability 
Constraint: Total Land 
Equations 3 and 4 represent land availability constraints.  This study separates land into 2 
categories: irrigable and non-irrigable land.  Equation 3 states that the total amount of non-
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irrigable and irrigable land used in each state for all crops (∑ 𝑙𝑛,𝑡,𝑟 ∗ 𝐻𝑛,𝑟𝑛 + ∑ 𝑙𝑖,𝑡,𝑟 ∗ 𝐻𝑖,𝑟𝑖 ) must 
not exceed the total land available in that state (Nr+Ir).   
 
4. 𝐼𝑟 ≥ ∑ 𝑙𝑖,𝑡,𝑟 ∗ 𝐻𝑖,𝑟𝑖   for ∀ 𝑟, 𝑡    Land Availability Constraint: Irrigated Land 
Equation 4 functions the same way as equation 3 for irrigable land.  The study assumes that the 
land availability for the model crops remains constant between 2004 and 2017. 
 
5. 𝑊𝑟 ≥ ∑ 𝑤𝑟𝑖,𝑟 ∗ 𝐻𝑖,𝑟𝑖    for ∀ 𝑟          Water Availability Constraint 
Equation 5 represents the irrigation water availability constraint.  This constraint uses the 
values for irrigation water availability calculated for each state as described above.  The 
equation states that the irrigated hectares of each crop (Hi,r) multiplied by the corresponding 
crop water requirements (wri,r)must not exceed the total irrigation water available in each state 
(Wr).  This study assumes that irrigation water availability will increase between 2004 and 2017.  
This rate of increase was calculated based on historical rates of increase in irrigation water 
potential in each of the model states.  In addition to a constraint on the quantity of water used, 
I also impose a constraint on the percentage of land devoted to a given crop which must be 
irrigated (see equation 6).   
 
6. 𝐻𝑎,𝑟 ∗ 𝜋𝑟,𝑐 ≤ 𝐻𝑖,𝑟   for ∀ 𝑟                     Irrigated Proportion Constraint 
Equation 6 states that the proportion of irrigated to non-irrigated land for each crop in each 
state must be greater than or equal to the proportion (𝛑r,c) observed in 2004.  
28 
 
7. 𝑆 + 𝐸𝑠 = 𝐶𝑠 ∗ 𝜂𝑐𝑠𝑐 ∗ 𝜂𝑠𝑐 + 𝐼𝑠           Balance Constraint: Sugar 
Equation 7 states that domestic (S) and international (Es) demand for Indian sugar cannot 
exceed the combination of domestic production of sugar and international imports.   
 
8. 𝐴 ≤ 𝑀𝑎 ∗ 𝜂𝑎
𝑚 + 𝐼𝑎         Balance Constraint: Alcohol 
Equation 8 constrains domestic alcohol production (A) to the amount of alcohol produced from 
molasses (𝑀𝑎 ∗ 𝜂𝑎𝑚) and the amount imported (Ia).   
 
9. 𝐸 = 𝑏 ∗ 𝐹              Blend Constraint: Ethanol 
Equation 9 represents the ethanol blend mandate proposed by the Government of India for the 
year 2017.  Specifically, the constraint requires that domestic gasoline fuel consumption (F) be 
made up of 20% ethanol (E) and 80% gasoline. 
      
10. 𝑀𝑒 + 𝑀𝑎 = 𝐶𝑠 ∗ 𝜂𝑐𝑠𝑐 ∗ 𝜂𝑚𝑐                 Balance Constraint: Molasses 
Equation 10 states that the amount of molasses based ethanol (Me) and industrial and potable 
alcohol (Ma) consumed in India must not exceed the amount of molasses produced as a 
byproduct of the sugar production process (𝐶𝑠 ∗ 𝜂𝑐𝑠𝑐 ∗ 𝜂𝑚𝑐 ). 
   
11. 𝐸𝑇 = 𝐶𝑒 ∗ 𝜂𝑐𝑠𝑐 ∗ 𝜂𝑒𝑐 + 𝐸𝑇𝑚        Balance Constraint Ethanol 
Equation 11 states that the fuel ethanol consumed in India (ET) cannot exceed the sum of the 
quantity of ethanol produced from sugarcane juice (𝐶𝑒 ∗ 𝜂𝑐𝑠𝑐 ∗ 𝜂𝑒𝑐)and that produced from 
molasses (𝐸𝑇𝑚). 
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12. 𝐸𝑇𝑚 ≤ 𝑀𝑒 ∗ 𝜂𝑒
𝑚                       Balance Constraint Molasses Ethanol 
Equation 14 states that the total quantity of molasses based ethanol produced (𝐸𝑇𝑚) must 
correspond with the quantity of molasses devoted to ethanol production (Me), multiplied by 
the appropriate conversion factor (𝜂𝑒𝑚). 
 
13. 𝐸𝑇𝑚 ≤ 0.5 ∗ 𝐸𝑇  Ratio Molasses-Based Ethanol in total Ethanol Constraint  
 
Equation 13 is an artificial constraint on the amount of ethanol that may be produced from 
molasses, which is specified here as 50%.  The rest is obtained directly from sugarcane juice.  
Currently India’s sugar and alcohol industries do not have the facilities required to produce 
ethanol using sugarcane juice as feedstock.  Therefore there is a great deal of uncertainty 
concerning the extent to which these producers will be able to convert to using this new 
technology between now and 2017.  The constraint above assumes that ethanol producers will 
be allowed to use this technology but at most 50% of the total ethanol production can come 
directly from sugarcane juice. 
 
14. ∑ 𝐻𝑎,𝑟𝑎 = ∑ 𝜆𝑦,𝑟 ∗𝑦 𝐻ℎ𝑖𝑦,𝑟,𝑐 + ∑ 𝛽𝑛,𝑟𝑛 *𝐻ℎ𝑦𝑛,𝑟,𝑐 for ∀ 𝑐, 𝑟            
   Historical and Hypothetical Mix Constraint 
 
15. ∑ 𝜆𝑦,𝑟 +𝑦 ∑ 𝛽𝑛,𝑟𝑛 = 1       Historical and Hypothetical Mix Weight Constraint 
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Equation 14 and 15 constrain the extent of changes in planted area of each crop in each state.  
My model uses historical crop mixes from the years 2000 to 2007 to ensure that the results are 
consistent with observed land use patterns.  In order to allow increased flexibility in planting 
behavior which would likely be necessary to accommodate a 20% ethanol blend mandate, I 
generate and use hypothetical crop mixes within the model using a method developed by Önal 
(2009).  Each hypothetical mix represents a potential land use pattern and is created using 
assumed own and cross price acreage elasticities and considering a set of price vectors in which 
prices are varied systematically.   
 
16. Ha,r; Dc; Ec; Ic; Cs; Ce; S; Es; Is; F; G; ET; Em; A;  Pc; Ps; Pa ≥ 0   for ∀ 𝑎, 𝑟, 𝑐   
        Non-negativity Constraint 
The final equation: equation 16 represents the non-negativity constraint for all of the model’s 
endogenous variables. 
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CHAPTER 4: DATA 
 
This study models 15 of the most productive agricultural states in India: Andhra 
Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Chattisgarh, Gujarat, Haryana, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, 
Maharashtra, Punjab, Orissa, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal.  The nine 
model crops chosen here are among the crops with the highest acreage in at least one of the 
model states: sugarcane, rice, wheat, sorghum, corn, groundnut, rapeseed, cotton and soy.  The 
base year chosen for the study is 2004-05 (due to the lack of more recent data). 
 
National Level Data 
Agricultural Market Data: 
The most recent data on producer prices for each of the model crops was from 2003-04, 
one year prior to the base year 2004.  The data was obtained from the Indian Ministry of 
Agriculture’s Directorate of Economics and Statistics (GOI 2008a 
http://dacnet.nic.in/eands/At_Glance_2008/pcrops_new.html).  The price data is on the state 
level, therefore in order to convert it to national level prices I use data on state level production 
(also from the Directorate of Economics and Statistics) to calculate an average national price of 
a given crop, weighted by the proportion of the national total produced in a given state.  In 
order to update the 2003 data to the base year, price indices for each crop commodity were 
obtained from the Office of the Economic Advisor, Ministry of Commerce and Industry GOI (GOI 
2009 http://eaindustry.nic.in/).  The Ministry of Agriculture price data did not include prices for 
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soybean so these prices were obtained from the FAO PriceSTAT database (FAO 2009 
http://faostat.fao.org/site/570/DesktopDefault.aspx?PageID=570#ancor).   
Production data for 2003 and 2004 for the 8 model crops, and sugar were also obtained 
from the Directorate of Economics and Statistics website (GOI 2008a 
http://dacnet.nic.in/eands/At_Glance_2008/pcrops_new.html).  Production data for alcohol 
was obtained from the FAPRI (Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute) 2009 US and 
World Agricultural Outlook Database (FAPRI 2010 
http://www.fapri.iastate.edu/tools/outlook.aspx).  Demand projections for the year 2017 for 
each of the model crops and for sugar are found by calculating the projected growth rate in 
production between 2004 and 2017 predicted by the FAPRI US and World Agricultural Outlook 
Database and multiplying the 2004 production data by this growth rate.   
Separate urban and rural population own-price demand elasticities for the eight model crop 
commodities and sugar are obtained from Kumar (1994).  The rural and urban figures are 
combined through weighted averages using 2001 census data on rural and urban population in 
India.  All demand curves are assumed to be linear both for the domestic markets and all 
commodities and internationally traded commodities (sugar and alcohol).    
 
Fuel Market Data 
Gasoline demand for the base year was taken from data on gasoline sales put together 
by Indiastat (Indiastat 2009 
http://www.indiastat.com/petroleum/25/salesmarketingandconsumptionofpetroleumproducts
/248/stats.aspx ).  Projected gasoline demand for 2017 was obtained from the Report of the 
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Committee on the Development of Bio-fuel (GOI 2003).   Gasoline consumption in India in 2004 
came out to 11.19 billion liters and in 2017 it is projected to increase to 22.24 billion liters.   
Alcohol demand data for the base year along with projections for 2017 are obtained from the 
FAPRI database (FAPRI 2010 http://www.fapri.iastate.edu/tools/outlook.aspx).    
2017 was chosen as the model year because it represents the deadline instated by the 
Indian government for 20% blending of ethanol in all domestic gasoline fuel.  The demand 
projection for ethanol is therefore calculated first by projecting the consumption of gasoline 
fuel to 2017 and then taking 20% of this quantity to represent ethanol consumption and the 
remaining 80% to represent gasoline consumption. 
 
Trade 
In the model, trade is allowed for all agricultural commodities, alcohol and sugar.  Data 
on import and export quantities and prices for the base year were obtained from the Indian 
Ministry of Agriculture’s Directorate of Economics and Statistics with the exception of the 
export price of sugar which was obtained from the Indian Sugar Mills Association Handbook of 
Sugar Statistics.  India does not export enough of any of the commodities to have major 
influence on world markets so export demand elasticities were assumed to be lower than 
import supply elasticities.   Export demand elasticities of -1 and import supply elasticities of 3 
are assumed in the base scenario.    
 
State Level Data 
Land And Water: 
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Across the 15 Indian states represented in this study, there is considerable variation in 
biophysical growth conditions, land and water availability and agricultural market 
characteristics which leads to equivalent variability in crop production potential, growing 
seasons, cultivation costs and irrigation requirements across states.  The country can be divided 
into three main geographical regions: the Himalayas in the far north, the Indo –Gangetic Plain in 
the north-central area of the country and the Peninsula to the south.  This study focuses on the 
major rice wheat and sugarcane producing states of India.  These states can all be found in 
either the Indo-Gangetic Plain or the Peninsula regions.  The Indo-Gangetic plain encompasses 
the states of Punjab, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Rajasthan, Gujarat, Bihar, West Bengal and Assam 
among others.  This region is one of the most intensively farmed in the world.  Rainfall comes 
from the southwest monsoon during the summer and during other seasons, most of the region 
has access to irrigation water from rivers and wells.  This region includes the Thar or Great 
Indian Desert which encompasses most of the state of Rajasthan and portions of Haryana, 
Punjab and Gujarat.  This region receives little rain and is dependent on canal systems for 
water.  Peninsular India includes the states of Madhya Pradesh, Chattisgarh, Orissa, 
Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu.  To the east and west are coastal 
plains which extend 100 to 200 kms into the interior benefit from two monsoon seasons: one in 
the summer and one in the fall.  Farther inland is the Peninsular Plateau which is drier but 
varies greatly in its soil quality and access to irrigation infrastructure (Heitzman and Worden 
1996).    
The great geographical variability among India’s states has led to high variability in crop 
yields as well.  Figure 4.1 demonstrates that sugarcane yields differ dramatically between the 
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three top sugarcane producing states in India: Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu.  
Irrigated yields averaged 91 MT per hectare in Maharashtra during the 2004 to 2005 growing 
season while in Uttar Pradesh they averaged 53 MT.  This however is not necessarily an 
indicator that Maharashtra is the preferred location for sugarcane expansion as this data set 
does not take into account growing season length and costs of production.  In fact when 
growing seasons are compared across these three states, Maharashtra’s is the longest by far,  
16 months to Uttar Pradesh’s 10 (GOI 2008a).  Therefore, even though yields in Maharashtra 
are higher, growing sugarcane on a given parcel of land in this state comes at the cost of being 
unable to grow other crops on that land for 6 months longer than other states in India.  In 
addition, agricultural production, particularly sugarcane production is more energy and water 
intensive in Maharashtra than in the other states, as illustrated in Figure 4.5.   
In 2004, farmers in Maharashtra irrigated 100% of the state’s 516 thousand hectares of 
sugarcane fields, consuming 60% of the irrigation water available to the state (Adholeya et al. 
2008).  Uttar Pradesh by contrast irrigated 91% of its sugarcane fields that year.  In addition, 
over a given growing season sugarcane requires approximately 114 cm of irrigation water in 
Maharashtra compared to only around 40 cm in Uttar Pradesh (Majumdar 2006).  Figure 4.5 
highlights the extent of the difference in costs between the main sugarcane growing regions in 
India and the differences in intensity of water and fertilizer use in sugarcane cultivation.   
Agricultural production costs per ton also vary to a great extent across states (see Table 
4.2).  Costs are measured in Indian rupees per ton.   Irrigated rice costs in 2004-2005 were as 
high as 208.85 rupees/ton in Rajasthan and as low as 20.15 rupees/ton in Assam.  As a result of 
the extended growing season and higher intensity of input usage in Maharashtra, production 
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costs are higher than in other regions.   The cost of producing one metric ton of sugarcane on 
irrigated land in Maharashtra was 5.01 rupees in 2004 while in Uttar Pradesh the cost was 
approximately half as much, averaging 2.61 rupees/ton (GOI 2007).   
In 1987 45% of India’s total land area was used for crop cultivation.  Of the remaining 
55%, 15 million hectares consisted of permanent pasture or orchards, and 108 million hectares 
were used for non-agricultural purposes, forest or were unusable for agriculture due to 
topography. That leaves 45 million hectares of mostly “cultivable wasteland” for potential 
expansion of agricultural production, however much of this land is currently unsuitable for 
sowing (Heitzman and Worden 1996).  Therefore, expansion of agricultural production in India 
must be a product of yield improvements on the agricultural land currently in use.  It is evident 
from Figure 4.6 that the amount of land going into agricultural use has not been expanding 
significantly in India in recent history.  Figure 4.8 shows that in general there is limited 
cultivable land for biofuels expansion in India which is not already in use.    In this study 
therefore I assume that land availability will remain constant between 2004 and 2017.  In 
Maharashtra there is vast cropland available but sugarcane expansion there would require 
considerable substitution with other crops.  In addition most of the land in this state is non-
irrigated land, which is unsuitable for sugarcane cultivation under the local growing conditions.  
The combination of lower water and land requirements and greater availability of irrigation 
water in the northern region states of Uttar Pradesh and Bihar may allow sugarcane expansion 
to occur with reduced impact on the production of food crops such as wheat and rice than if 
the Indian government were to encourage the expansion in the central region and the state of 
Maharashtra (GOI 2008a).   
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Another major limiting factor for growth in agricultural productivity in India is water 
scarcity.  Groundwater tables are falling as water demand by households and industry rapidly 
increases.  Much of the water scarcity can be explained by government policies.  Agricultural 
sector electricity subsidies for example encourage excessive pumping of groundwater (WFP 
2008).  Findings by recent studies suggest that India does not have sufficient water resources to 
support agricultural activity beyond that currently being conducted.  Rodell et al. (2009) used 
satellite data to determine that the region comprising the states of Haryana, Punjab and 
Rajasthan are depleting their groundwater stores much more quickly than they are being 
recharged.   According to Garg and Hassan (2007) official calculations of utilizable water 
resources released by the Government of India have been over-estimated by at least 66%.  In 
addition, they find that even assuming a low water demand, India will be running a 
considerable water deficit on a national level by the year 2050. 
Data on land use collected by the Ministry of Agriculture, GOI for the year 2004-05 is 
used to estimate land availability in each state (GOI 2008a).  Only land used for the nine 
modeled crops: rice, wheat, sugarcane, sorghum, corn, groundnut, rapeseed, cotton and 
soybeans is included in the land availability constraint. This land is divided into irrigable and 
non-irrigable land based on data from the “Agricultural Statistics at a Glance 2008” which gives 
percentages of irrigated versus non-irrigated land used by each crop in a given state.   Data on 
land use by crop in India is available in terms of gross planted hectares of each crop by state 
over a given year.  In order to determine the total net irrigated and non-irrigated land available 
in a given year for a given state a simple program was set up:   
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Minimize     ∑ 𝐿𝑁𝑟 +𝑟 𝐿𝐼𝑟    subject to 
𝐿𝐼𝑟 ≥�𝑙𝑟𝑖𝑟,𝑡,𝑟 ∗ 𝐻𝑖𝑟,𝑟
𝑖𝑟
 
 
𝐿𝑁𝑟 ≥�𝑙𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑟,𝑡,𝑟 ∗ 𝐻𝑛𝑖𝑟,𝑟
𝑛𝑖𝑟
 
ℎ𝑖𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑒2004,𝑟,𝑐 = 𝐻𝑐,𝑟 
 
ℎ𝑖𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑒2004,𝑟,𝑐 ∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟,𝑐 = 𝐻𝑖𝑟,𝑟 
 
Where r is the regional parameter, c is the crop parameter, ir is the irrigated crop 
activity parameter, nir is the non-irrigated crop activity parameter, t is the time parameter in 
months, LN is the total available non-irrigated land, LI is the available irrigated land, lr is the 
monthly land (crop calendar) use of a given crop, H is land use variable (in 1000 ha), hiacre is 
the historical land mix and propirr is the proportion or irrigated to non-irrigated land used for a 
given crop in a given region.  The program allocates the known planted area of each crop to 
various months of the year based on each state’s crop calendar.  It thereby determines the 
minimum total irrigated and non-irrigated land needed to accommodate the gross planted 
irrigated and non-irrigated hectares of each model crop in the base year (2004).    These values 
are then used in the land availability constraints (equations 3 and 4) to represent the total 
irrigable and non-irrigable land available to the model crops in each state.  The study assumes 
that the land availability for the model crops remains constant between 2004 and 2017.   
39 
 
The quantity of irrigation water available to the model crops is constrained on a state by state 
basis.  The maximum quantity available during the base year case is determined by multiplying 
the observed model crop acreages from each state by the corresponding irrigation water 
requirements of each crop in each state.  The state specific crop water requirements were 
obtained from Majumdar (2000).  Because irrigation requirement data were not available for all 
states, as a proxy, the data for adjacent or geographically close states were used to generate 
the missing data.   
Irrigation potential throughout most of India has been growing over the last two 
decades due to government sponsored irrigation infrastructural projects.  Figure 4.7 illustrates 
this trend.  This study therefore assumes that the irrigation potential changes at varying rates in 
each of the model states between 2004 and 2017.  Data on state level irrigation potential over 
a period of 22 years was obtained from the Indian Central Water Commission.  This data is 
regressed over the 22 year time span to calculate the rate of increase in irrigation potential for 
each model state.  These rates are then applied to the base year irrigation water quantities to 
obtain values for maximum water availability to model crops in each state for the year 2017. 
Both the base year and 2017 model results are constrained based on the proportion of 
irrigated to non-irrigated cropping practices used for each crop in each state during the base 
year.  Specifically, the base year proportion is imposed as the lower bound for the model.  
Because of a lack of data on regional climate and differences in costs and yields between 
irrigated and non-irrigated practice, such a constraint is necessary to prevent the model from 
predicting unrealistically low use of irrigated cultivation practices.   
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Constraints are applied to keep the planted area of land for each of the modeled crops 
in each state within bounds determined by historical and hypothetical land mixes.  Data on 
historical crop mixes was obtained from the Agricultural Statistics at a Glance (GOI 2008a) for 
the years 2001-2003 and 2004-2008.  
 
Yield and Production Data 
I obtain the base year irrigated yield data from the “Agricultural Statistics at a Glance 
2006” published by the Department of Economics and Statistics of the Ministry of Agriculture 
GOI (GOI 2008a) .  These yield figures represent averages of irrigated and non-irrigated 
cropping practices.  Therefore in order to obtain figures for both irrigated and non-irrigated 
yields, I use the yield data from the Central Water Commission GOI Water and Related Statistics 
report (GOI 2008c), which lists yield data from 1998 through 2003 for both irrigated and non-
irrigated cropping practices.  Using this data I first calculate the ratio of irrigated to non-
irrigated yields.  Next, using the following formula I am able to calculate separate yield values 
for irrigated and non-irrigated cropping practices for each crop in each state: 
 
𝑦𝑎𝑣𝑔 = 𝑦𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑟 + 𝑦𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑡  
 
where yavg = average yield, yirr = irrigated yield, ynon = non-irrigated yield, airr = irrigated acreage, 
anon = non-irrigated acreage and atot = total acreage.  Because yirr is equal to ynon multiplied by 
the ratio of irrigated to non-irrigated yields calculated using the Central Water Commission data 
I am able to solve for both yirr and ynon.   
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States missing yield or cost data are assumed to have the same yields/costs as 
geographically adjacent (or close as possible) states.  For example, Maharashtra’s rice cost data 
are taken from Uttar Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh’s wheat costs and yields are used to estimate 
Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Maharashtra’s wheat yields, Punjab’s sugarcane data come 
from Haryana, Bihar’s sugarcane data come from Uttar Pradesh and Maharashtra’s sorghum 
data are used to represent yields and costs in Bihar, Haryana and Uttar Pradesh. 
Crop yields have been increasing in India relatively steadily since the 1950s.  Figures 4.2-
4.4 show this upward trend in national production of rice, wheat and sugarcane.  I therefore 
assume that yields will increase at the rate observed for the period 1950-2007 between the 
model base year (2004) and 2017.  I calculate yields for each crop for the year 2017 by inflating 
the base year yield figures by a national level growth rate (see Table 4.4).  I then plot national 
level historical yield data from 1950-2007 for each model crop (GOI 2008a), assuming that the 
historical growth rate would stay constant between 2004 and 2017 and that this growth rate 
would be equal amongst all the model states.   I next compare linear and quadratic regressions 
of this data using time in years as the x –variable and yield in MT/hectare as the y-variable.   I 
then choose the regression with the highest R2 value.  With this regression equation I next 
calculate the yield predicted for 2017.  Finally I calculate the yield growth rate from 2004 to 
2017 by dividing the predicted 2017 by the yield from the model base year (2004) and update 
the base year yield data to 2017 by applying this growth rate.   
 
Growing Seasons: 
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Crop calendar information for each state was obtained from the “Agricultural Statistics 
at a Glance 2008” published by the Department of Economics and Statistics of the Ministry of 
Agriculture GOI.  Data is given in terms of a range of possible planting months and harvesting 
months.  Because this study needs to allow for all possible crop rotations, the planting and 
harvesting months are chosen from their respective ranges (either earliest planting month with 
earliest harvesting month or latest with latest) in such a way as to cause the fewest conflicts 
with other crops.  Crop activities include irrigated and non-irrigated kharif (monsoon) rice, rabi 
(post monsoon) rice, wheat, sugarcane and kharif and rabi sorghum.  Each activity has been 
assigned a number ranging from 0 to 1 for each month of the year depending on whether or 
not the crop is in the ground during that month.  Additionally, an activity is assigned a 0.25 for a 
month in which it was only in the ground for the first week, 0.5 if it was in the ground for 2 
weeks and 0.75 if it was in the ground for 3 weeks of the month.  When the model allocates 
crop acreages to the available land, one given hectare of land in a given month may be assigned 
a value not to exceed 1.0.    As I was unable to obtain state-wise sorghum crop calendar data, 
the maize crop calendar data is used as a substitute because of the similarity in the growth 
patterns of the two crops. 
 
Agricultural Cost Data: 
Costs of cultivation are measured in Indian rupees per hectare.  The cost figures are the 
sum of the costs from the following categories: labor, seed, fertilizer, manure, pesticides, 
irrigation, interest on capital, land taxes and depreciation on farm equipment (see Table 4.1).  
The cost data is taken from the crop budgets as recorded in the “Reports of the Commission for 
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Agricultural Costs and Prices” (GOI 2008b).  “A1” costs, or “all actual expenses in cash and kind 
incurred in production by the owner” are used to represent total production costs. 
  Because the costs as given in the crop budgets assumed the use of irrigation, in order to 
calculate non-irrigated practice expenses, “irrigation charges” budget line has been removed 
and quantity and cost of fertilizer is assumed to be half that used with irrigation.  Costs are 
assumed to remain constant between 2004 and 2017. 
 
Processing Data 
Data on conversion factors involved in manufacture of sugar from sugarcane are 
obtained from the Indian Sugar Mills Association Hand Book of Sugar Statistics (2008).   
Conversion factors for the process of distillation of molasses into ethanol were obtained from 
the All India Distiller’s Association (see Table 4.9).   
 
Data on costs involved in manufacturing of sugar from sugarcane are obtained from the 
Indian Sugar Mills Association Hand Book of Sugar Statistics (2008).   Cost data for the 
distillation of molasses to produce ethanol was obtained from the All India Distiller’s 
Association.  The data on cost of conversion of sugarcane to ethanol in India was unavailable 
because at the time of this study this process was prohibited by Indian law.  I obtain an 
estimate of the cost ratio between molasses to ethanol conversion and sugarcane to ethanol 
conversion in India from a report by Kumar and Agrawal (2003).  According to their estimates 
the cost of conversion of sugarcane directly to ethanol is 17% higher than the cost of converting 
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molasses to ethanol.  According to a USDA report however (USDA 2006) the cost in the US of 
converting sugarcane to ethanol is 2.55 times greater than using molasses as feedstock.     
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Figures and Tables 
 
Figure 4.1: Sugarcane Yields 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Historical Rice Yield 
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Figure 4.3: Historical Wheat Yield 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Historical Sugarcane Yield 
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Figure 4.5: Irrigated Sugarcane Costs 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Historical Land Use 
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Figure 4.7: Historical Irrigation Potential 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.8: Land Availability 
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Figure 4.9: Maps
Sugarcane Irrigated Yield 
(kg/ha)
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Table 4.1: Example Crop Budget: Sugarcane 
 
  
Andhra 
Pradesh Haryana Karnataka Maharashtra Tamil Nadu 
Uttar 
Pradesh  
Cost Items (Rs/ha)             
Human Labour             
Casual 12713.47 6167.43 12357.27 11851.75 16962.25 3481.44 
Attached 905.81 1319.18   606.06 2097.07 242.16 
Bullock Labour             
Hired 441.48 28.27 427.58 1289.62 160.04 65.91 
Owned 579.58 12.69 1140.23 760.83 163.47 315.23 
Machine Labour             
Hired 843.33 297.41 54.68 9068.29 1114.19 349.25 
Owned 20.29 1262.35   17.22 34.78 511.07 
              
Seed 4535.69 1139.87 2283.46 4076.30 5022.54 2060.59 
Fertilzer 3784.29 2141.10 7639.69 6774.59 4594.79 2077.12 
Manure 1105.00   263.37 428.87 998.28 205.52 
Insecticides 321.55 635.51 288.93 65.07 183.16 25.43 
Irrigation Charges 1985.94 2185.76 6063.81 7175.07 3532.55 2640.41 
Interest on working 
capital 1702.26 949.35 1918.69 2632.13 2178.95 748.38 
Miscellaneous             
Fixed Cost             
Land Revenue, cesses 
and taxes 19.46   17.37 282.37 89.83 29.60 
Depreciation on 
implements 227.21 401.04 500.66 508.09 540.70 1077.41 
              
Costs Other than 
Actual Expenses             
Family Labor 2494.25 3966.05 5737.72 4846.11 4468.32 4988.04 
Rental value of owned 
land 19081.54 23929.60 19419.72 17355.17 15179.08 12910.39 
Rent paid for leased-
in land         27.04 28.01 
Interest on fixed 
capital 1904.32 3130.59 1074.96 3983.92 4769.74 4312.25 
              
Total (irr) 29185.36 16539.96 32955.74 45536.26 37672.60 13829.52 
Total (non) 25307.275 13283.65 23072.085 34973.895 31842.655 10150.55 
source: Reports of the Commission for Agricultural Costs and Prices 2007-08, Ministry of Agriculture GOI 
2008 
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Table 4.2: Costs per Metric Ton (Rs/MT) 
 
  Rice(non) Rice (irr) 
Wheat 
(non) 
Wheat 
(irr) 
Sugarcane 
(non) 
Sugarcane 
(irr) 
AndhraPradesh 46.04 28.08 101.11 39.77* 6.35 4.40 
Bihar 46.63 35.24 47.77 39.59 2.29 2.61* 
Haryana 33.52 37.29 54.35 29.64 4.55 2.55 
Karnataka 73.57 43.19 101.11 39.77* 4.24 3.63 
Maharashtra 31.52 31.36* 70.50 39.77* 6.47 5.01 
Punjab 26.68 21.02 58.84 25.90 4.55 2.55* 
TamilNadu 59.46 43.78 
    UttarPradesh 31.52 31.36 68.17 39.77 2.29 2.61 
Assam 20.15 11.28 57.87 60.73* 6.47 5.01* 
Chattisgarh 45.53 27.83 87.25 61.09 6.47 5.01* 
Gujarat 86.52 50.61* 137.17 34.85 6.47 5.01* 
MadhyaPradesh 96.19 50.61 52.56 35.83 6.47 5.01* 
Orissa 43.17 30.65 82.38 60.73* 6.47 5.01* 
Rajasthan 208.85 50.61* 44.24 28.45 6.47 5.01* 
West Bengal 36.30 35.35 62.96 60.73 6.47 5.01* 
*Rice cost data for Maharashtra taken from Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat and Rajasthan data taken from 
Madhya Pradesh 
Wheat cost data for Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Maharashtra taken from Uttar Pradesh, Assam and 
Orissa data taken from West Bengal 
Sugarcane cost data for Bihar taken from Uttar Pradesh, Punjab data taken from Haryana, and Assam, 
Chattisgarh, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan and West Bengal data taken from 
Maharashtra 
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Table 4.3: Ethanol Production Costs 
 
  Quantity Rate Rs/l Cost  Rs/l 
Molasses Cost (5kg)     15.22 
Steam kg 3.1 0.5 1.55 
Power kwh 0.15 4.5 0.68 
Chemicals litres 0.002 128 0.26 
Labour     0.25 
Repair and Maintenance   0.05 0.67 
Cost of replacement of molecular sieve     0.04 
Manufacturing overheads   0.1 1.91 
Depreciation   0.1 1.33 
Administrative overheads   0.05 1.12 
Interest on borrowed capital (debt/equity ratio 
1:5:1)   0.135 1.08 
Interest on working capital   0.135 0.81 
Total cost of production     24.92 
Selling and distribution overheads   0.05 1.27 
Total     26.19 
cost of conversion     9.70 
 source: All India Distillers Association (personal communication 2009)  
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Table 4.4: Yields (MT/ha) 
 
  
Rice 
  
Wheat 
  
Sugarcane 
  
Sorghum 
  
Corn 
  
Groundnut 
  
Rapeseed 
  
Cotton 
  
Soy 
  
  
Yield 
non 
2017 
Yield 
irr 
2017 
Yield 
non 
2017 
Yield 
irr 
2017 
Yield 
non 
2017 
Yield 
irr 
2017 
Yield 
non 
2017 
Yield 
irr 
2017 
Yield 
non 
2017 
Yield 
irr 
2017 
Yield 
non 
2017 
Yield 
irr 
2017 
Yield 
non 
2017 
Yield 
irr 
2017 
yield 
non 
2017 
yiel
d irr 
201
7 
yield 
non 
2017 
yield 
irr 
2017 
Andhra 
Pradesh 2.07 3.77 0.42 1.48* 53.14 85.01 1.16 4.13 3.32 3.98 1.03 0.84 1.10 
 
0.33 0.47 2.05 1.06 
Bihar 0.75 1.09 1.63 2.09 42.08 47.86* 1.22 
 
2.75 2.63 
  
0.82 1.01 
    Haryana 2.96 3.49 2.45 5.02 32.18 68.82 0.28 0.34 2.90 3.20 1.75 
 
1.12 1.38 0.39 0.60 
  Karnataka 2.03 3.70 0.42 1.48* 
 
88.55 0.95 1.90 3.04 3.76 0.83 1.00 1.10 
 
0.18 0.37 0.70 1.00 
Maharashtra 1.76 1.52* 0.91 2.25* 
 
69.77 0.91 0.95 1.99 1.91 1.81 
 
0.87 1.35 0.18 0.29 1.16 1.38 
Punjab 2.71 4.69 2.48 5.46 47.78 67.04* 
  
2.42 3.51 1.75 
 
0.76 1.18 0.74 0.00 
  TamilNadu 2.19 3.29 
   
111.34 0.74 1.52 1.52 2.27 1.74 2.08 
  
0.19 0.37 2.02 
 UttarPradesh  1.76 2.27 1.59 3.25 59.70 67.91 1.22 
 
1.86 2.05 0.92 
 
0.99 1.22 
 
0.60 1.16 
 
Assam 1.64 2.76 1.36* 
 
40.83
* 
   
3.35 
   
0.59 0.77 0.33 
   Chattisgarh 1.15 1.97 1.34 2.80 
 
61.65* 0.65 0.68 1.55 2.72 1.64 
 
0.73 1.56 
  
1.07 
 Gujarat 1.44 2.66* 0.63 3.54 
 
81.78* 1.37 1.57 1.00 1.19 1.12 0.39 0.90 1.56 0.25 0.72 1.83 
 Madhya 
Pradesh 0.76 1.55 1.21 2.50 24.95 45.23* 1.15 
 
1.53 3.73 1.43 
 
0.87 1.35 0.19 0.21 1.07 1.27 
Orissa 1.43 2.10 
 
2.69* 
 
61.65* 0.65 
 
3.30 5.80 1.45 1.30 0.67 1.44 0.33 
   Rajasthan 0.29 1.27* 1.67 3.66 
 
81.78* 0.56 0.67 1.35 1.61 2.40 1.29 0.90 1.27 0.27 0.31 1.75 2.94 
West Bengal 2.73 3.36 2.06 2.85 69.47 76.59* 0.65 
 
3.17 4.35 
  
0.70 1.47 0.33 
    Source: Agricultural Statistics at a Glance2006 Ministry of Agriculture GOI http://dacnet.nic.in/eands/At_A_Glance/pcrops.html 
*Rice yield data for Maharashtra taken from Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat and Rajasthan data taken from Madhya Pradesh  
Wheat yield data for Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Maharashtra taken from Uttar Pradesh, Assam and Orissa data taken from West Bengal.  
Sugarcane yield data for Bihar taken from Uttar Pradesh, Punjab data taken from Haryana, and Assam, Chattisgarh, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, 
Orissa, Rajasthan and West Bengal data taken from Maharashtra 
 
  
54 
 
Table 4.5: Yield Growth Rates 
  
Growth 
Rate(2004-
2017) 
x 
coefficient 
x^2 
coefficient 
y-
intercept r2-value 
Rice 1.18 25.57   612.37 0.94 
Wheat 1.28 43.44   374.33 0.96 
Sugarcane 1.1 1153.57 -7.55 27943 0.94 
Sorghum 1.2 9.96 -0.02 373.3 0.79 
Corn 1.12 23.09   -44424 0.88 
Groundnut 1.13 7.65   -14280 0.49 
Rapeseed 1.11 13.28   -25635 0.85 
Cotton 1.06 4.16   -8049 0.74 
Soy 1.29 10.8   -20368 0.38 
Source: Agricultural Statistics at a Glance2006 Ministry of Agriculture GOI 
http://dacnet.nic.in/eands/At_Glance_2008/pcrops_new.html 
 
Table 4.6: Prices 
  Domestic Export Import 
Rice (Rs/MT) 5709.72 7288.27 8722.31 
Wheat (Rs/ MT) 6373.46 7265.14 9623.21 
Sorghum (Rs/ MT) 5906.25 0.00 0.00 
Corn (Rs/ MT) 4853.47 0.00 0.00 
Groundnut (Rs/ MT) 15860.03 30878.92 40142.57 
Rapeseed (Rs/ MT) 17755.64 0.00 0.00 
Cotton (Rs/ MT) 18092.58 48774.24 62100.94 
Soybean (Rs/ MT) 9300.00 0.00 0.00 
Sugar (Rs/ MT) 11913.14 7118.19 16745.16 
Alcohol (Rs/l) 23.20 0.00 23.20 
Source: Farm Harvest Prices of Principal Crops in India Ministry of Agriculture GOI  
http://dacnet.nic.in/eands/fhprice/State%20Wise01-04.pdf 
Soybean prices: FAOSTAT PriceSTAT 
http://faostat.fao.org/site/570/DesktopDefault.aspx?PageID=570#ancor 
Alcohol prices: Biofuels in India Premia 2005  http://www.biomatnet.org/publications/1838bin.pdf 
Import and export prices: Agricultural Statistics at a Glance2006 Ministry of Agriculture GOI 
http://dacnet.nic.in/eands/At_A_Glance/Rates13-14.htm 
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Table 4.7: Elasticities 
  
Domestic 
Demand 
Export 
Demand 
Import 
Supply 
Rice -0.73 -1 3 
Wheat -0.84 -1 3 
Sorghum -0.3     
Corn -0.3     
Groundnut -0.54 -1 3 
Rapeseed -0.54     
Cotton -0.5 -1 3 
Soy -0.54     
Sugar -0.39 -1 3 
Alcohol -0.55 -1 3 
Source: domestic elasticities: Gulati, A., and T. Kelley, 1999.Trade Liberalization and Indian Agriculture. 
Oxford University Press, New Delhi 
 
Table 4.8: Consumption 
  
Domestic 
2004 
Domestic 
2017 
Export 
2004 
Import 
2004 
Rice (1000 MT) 78133.89 102088.00 3615.10 0.00 
Wheat (1000 MT) 66608.26 84323.10 2009.35 0.00 
Sorghum (1000 MT) 7240 8165.31 0.00 0.00 
Corn (1000 MT) 12437.01 18453.40 0.00 0.00 
Groundnut (1000 
MT) 6659.65 6775.55 177.15 0.00 
Rapeseed (1000 
MT) 7506.51 6938.77 0.00 0.00 
Cotton (1000 MT) 2767.4 4134.21 86.64 0.00 
Soybean (1000 MT) 6770.39 14761.70 0.00 0.00 
Sugar (1000 MT) 12319.15 19704.00 0.00 932.74 
Alcohol (million l) 1267.26 2131.56 0.00 0.00 
Source: domestic: Source: Agricultural Statistics at a Glance2006 Ministry of Agriculture GOI 
http://dacnet.nic.in/eands/At_A_Glance/pcrops.html 
Sugar: Handbook of Sugar Statistics, Indian Sugar Mills Association 2008 
Alcohol: FAPRI 2010 US and World Agricultural Outlook Database 
http://www.fapri.iastate.edu/tools/outlook.aspx 
Exports and imports: Agricultural Statistics at a Glance2006 Ministry of Agriculture GOI 
http://dacnet.nic.in/eands/At_A_Glance/Rates13-14.htm 
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Table 4.9: Irrigation Requirements (cm) 
  Rice Wheat  Sugarcane Sorghum 
Andhra Pradesh 116.8 33.02 114.3 31.48 
Bihar 68.5 27.94 40.005 12.50 
Haryana 34.7 33.02 172.72 12.50 
Karnataka 116.8 33.02 114.3 31.48 
Maharashtra 116.8 30.48 114.3 31.48 
Punjab 34.7 33.02 172.72 12.50 
Tamil Nadu 116.8 33.02 114.3 31.5 
Uttar Pradesh west 34.7 27.94 40.005 12.50 
Assam 68.6 27.94 114.3 12.50 
Chattisgarh 45.7 30.48 114.3 12.50 
Gujarat 45.7 33.02 172.72 47.22 
MadhyaPradesh 45.7 30.48 114.3 47.22 
Orissa 45.7 30.48 114.3 12.50 
Rajasthan 45.7 33.02 172.72 47.22 
West Bengal 68.6 27.94 114.3 12.50 
*Corn, Groundnut, Rapeseed, Cotton and Soy use one value for all states 
Source: Majumdar, D.K. 2006.  Irrigation Water Management: Principles and Practice. Prentice Hall of 
India, New Delhi. 
 
Table 4.10: Sugar and Alcohol Costs and Conversion Factors 
 
Conversion 
Factors Sugarcane to Crushed Cane 0.5626 
  Crushed Cane to Sugar 0.1017 
  Crushed Cane to Molasses 0.044 
  
Crushed Cane to Ethanol (MT to 
liters) 70 
  Molasses to Ethanol (MT to liters) 225.225 
  Molasses to Alcohol (MT to liters) 213.96 
Costs Crushed Cane to Sugar (Rs/ton) 4168.6 
  Crushed Cane to Ethanol (Rs/l) 11.32 
  Molasses to Ethanol (Rs/l) 9.7 
  Molasses to Alcohol (Rs/l) 9.7 
 Sources: sugar: Handbook of Sugar Statistics, Indian Sugar Mills Association 2008 
 Crushed cane to ethanol conversion: Report of the Commission on Development of Biofuels 2003 
 Molasses to ethanol/alcohol conversion: Nguyen et al 2008 
Molasses to ethanol cost: All India Distillers Association (personal communication 2009) 
Crushed cane to ethanol cost: Kumar and Agrawal 2003. Alcohol: The Viable Energy Substitute 
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Table 4.11: Crop Calendar (months) 
State Rice (kharif) Rice (rabi) Wheat Sugarcane 
Andhra Pradesh 4.75 5 5 12 
Bihar 6  4 11 
Haryana 5  5 11 
Karnataka 5.75 5.25 3 9 
Maharashtra 4  5 16 
Punjab 5  7 11 
Tamil Nadu* 5.75 5.25 3 9 
Uttar Pradesh* 5  7 11 
Assam 4  4 9 
Chattisgarh* 6  5 9 
Gujarat 4  4 9 
Madhya Pradesh 3  3 12.5 
Orissa 6  5 9 
Rajasthan 4  4 9 
West Bengal 4  4 9 
*Data for Tamil Nadu taken from Karnataka, data for Uttar Pradesh taken from Punjab, data for Chattisgarh 
taken from Orissa 
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Table 4.12: Crop Calendar 
Month 
State Crop J F M A M J J A S O N D J F M A M J J A S O N D 
AndhraPrade
sh Rice (k) 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
0.7
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Rice (r) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Wheat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Sugarcane 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Sorghum 
(k) 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Sorghum 
(r) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.2
5 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Corn (k) 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Corn (r) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.2
5 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Groundnut 
(k)           
0.7
5 1 1 0.5                               
 
Groundnut 
(r)                     0.5 1 1 
0.7
5                     
 
Rapeseed                     0.5 1 1 0.5                     
 
Cotton           
0.2
5 1 1 1 1 1 
0.7
5                         
 
Soybean           0.5 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.5                       
 
                                                  
Bihar Rice 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Wheat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Sugarcane 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Sorghum 
(k) 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 1 1 1 1 
0.2
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Sorghum 
(r) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 1 1 1 
0.2
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Corn (k) 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 1 1 1 1 
0.2
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 4.12 (cont.) 
 
 
Corn (r) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 1 1 1 
0.2
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Groundnut                                                 
 
Rapeseed                   
0.7
5 1 1 1 
0.2
5                     
 
Cotton                                                 
 
Soybean                                                 
 
                                                  
Haryana Rice 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Wheat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Sugarcane 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Sorghum 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 1 1 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Corn 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 1 1 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Ragi 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 1 1 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Groundnut           
0.7
5 1 1 1 
0.2
5                             
 
Rapeseed                    
0.7
5 1 1 1 1 
0.2
5                   
 
Cotton       
0.
7
5 1 1 1 1 1 0.5                             
 
Soybean             
0.7
5 1 1 1 1 
0.2
5                         
 
                                                  
Karnataka Rice (k) 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
0.7
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Rice (r) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.2
5 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Wheat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Sugarcane 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 
Sorghum 
(k) 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
0.2
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Sorghum 
(r) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.2
5 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 4.12 (cont.) 
 
 
Corn (k) 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
0.2
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Corn (r) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.2
5 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Groundnut         
0.7
5 1 1 1 
0.2
5                               
 
Rapeseed                      0.5 1 1 0.5                     
 
Cotton           
0.2
5 1 1 1 1 1 
0.7
5                         
 
Soybean           
0.7
5 1 1 1 1 
0.2
5                           
 
                                                  
Maharashtra Rice 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Wheat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Sugarcane 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 
 
Sorghum 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
0.2
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Corn 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
0.2
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Groundnut             
0.7
5 1 1 
0.2
5                             
 
Rapeseed                  
0.2
5 1 1 0.5                         
 
Cotton         
0.7
5 1 1 1 1 
0.2
5                             
 
Soybean             
0.7
5 1 1 1 1 
0.2
5                         
 
                                                  
Punjab Rice 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Wheat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Sugarcane 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Sorghum 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
0.2
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 4.12 (cont.) 
 
 
Corn 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
0.2
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Groundnut           
0.7
5 1 1 1 
0.2
5                             
 
Rapeseed                    
0.7
5 1 1 1 1 
0.2
5                   
 
Cotton       
0.
7
5 1 1 1 1 
0.2
5                               
 
Soybean             
0.7
5 1 1 1 1 
0.2
5                         
 
                                                  
TamilNadu Rice (k) 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
0.7
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Rice (r) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.2
5 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Wheat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Sugarcane 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 
Sorghum 
(k) 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
0.7
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Sorghum 
(r) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.2
5 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Corn (k) 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
0.7
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Corn (r) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0.2
5 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Groundnut         
0.7
5 1 1 1 
0.2
5                               
 
Rapeseed                                                  
 
Cotton           
0.2
5 1 1 1 1 1 
0.7
5                         
 
Soybean           0.5 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.5                       
 
                                                  
UttarPradesh Rice 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Wheat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
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Table 4.12 (cont.) 
 
 
Sugarcane 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Sorghum 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
0.2
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Corn 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 
0.2
5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
Groundnut           
0.7
5 1 1 1 
0.2
5                             
 
Rapeseed                    
0.7
5 1 1 1 
0.2
5                     
 
Cotton       
0.
7
5 1 1 1 1 
0.2
5                               
 
Soybean             
0.7
5 1 1 1 1 
0.2
5                         
 
                                                  
 
Rice           
0.7
5 1 1 1 
0.2
5                             
Assam Wheat                     
0.7
5 1 1 1 
0.2
5                   
 
Sugarcane     0.75 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0.2
5                         
 
Sorghum 
(k)     0.75 1 1 
0.2
5                                     
 
Sorghum 
(r)                     
0.7
5 1 1 1 
0.2
5                   
 
Corn(k)     0.75 1 1 
0.2
5                                     
 
Corn (r)                     
0.7
5 1 1 1 
0.2
5                   
 
Groundnut                                                 
 
Rapeseed                    0.5 1 1 1 
0.2
5                     
 
Cotton                   
0.7
5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0.2
5       
 
Soybean           
0.7
5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0.2
5                     
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Table 4.12 (cont.) 
 
 
Rice           0.5 1 1 1 1 1 0.5                         
Chattisgarh Wheat                   0.5 1 1 1 1 0.5                   
 
Sugarcane   0.5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.5                           
 
Sorghum           0.5 1 1 0.5                               
 
Corn           0.5 1 1 0.5                               
 
Groundnut           0.5 1 1 0.5                               
 
Rapeseed                      0.5 1 1 0.5                     
 
Cotton                                                 
 
Soybean             
0.7
5 1 1 1 1 
0.2
5                         
 
                                                  
 
Rice           
0.7
5 1 1 1 
0.2
5                             
Gujarat Wheat                   
0.7
5 1 1 1 
0.2
5                     
 
Sugarcane     0.75 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0.2
5                         
 
Sorghum           
0.7
5 1 1 
0.2
5                               
 
Corn           
0.7
5 1 1 
0.2
5                               
 
Groundnut           
0.7
5 1 1 
0.2
5                               
 
Rapeseed                    
0.7
5 1 1 1 1 
0.7
5                   
 
Cotton         
0.7
5 1 1 1 1 
0.2
5                             
 
Soybean                                                 
 
                                                  
 
Rice           0.5 1 1 
0.7
5                               
MadhyaPrad
esh Wheat                   0.5 1 1 1 0.5                     
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Table 4.12 (cont.) 
 
 
Sugarcane                   
0.7
5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0.7
5     
 
Sorghum           0.5 1 
0.
5                                 
 
Corn           0.5 1 
0.
5                                 
 
Groundnut           0.5 1 1 0.5                               
 
Rapeseed                  
0.2
5 1 1 0.5                         
 
Cotton                                                 
 
Soybean             
0.7
5 1 1 1 1 
0.2
5                         
 
                                                  
 
Rice           0.5 1 1 1 1 1 0.5                         
Orissa Wheat                   0.5 1 1 1 1 0.5                   
 
Sugarcane   0.5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.5                           
 
Sorghum           0.5 1 1 0.5                               
 
Corn           0.5 1 1 0.5                               
 
Groundnut           0.5 1 1 0.5                               
 
Rapeseed                      0.5 1 1 0.5                     
 
Cotton           0.5 1 1 1 1 0.5                           
 
Soybean             
0.7
5 1 1 1 1 
0.2
5                         
 
                                                  
 
Rice           
0.7
5 1 1 1 
0.2
5                             
Rajasthan Wheat                     
0.7
5 1 1 1 
0.2
5                   
 
Sugarcane     0.75 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0.2
5                         
 
Sorghum           
0.7
5 1 1 1 
0.2
5                             
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Table 4.12 (cont.) 
 
 
Corn           
0.7
5 1 1 1 
0.2
5                             
 
Groundnut           
0.7
5 1 1 1 
0.2
5                             
 
Rapeseed                    
0.7
5 1 1 1 1 
0.7
5                   
 
Cotton       
0.
7
5 1 1 1 1 
0.2
5                               
 
Soybean             
0.7
5 1 1 1 1 
0.2
5                         
 
                                                  
 
Rice             
0.7
5 1 1 1 
0.2
5                           
West Bengal Wheat                     
0.7
5 1 1 1 
0.2
5                   
 
Sugarcane   0.5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.5                           
 
Sorghum 
(k)     0.75 1 1 
0.2
5                                     
 
Sorghum 
(r)                     
0.7
5 1 1 1 
0.2
5                   
 
Corn(k)     0.75 1 1 
0.2
5                                     
 
Corn (r)                     
0.7
5 1 1 1 
0.2
5                   
 
Groundnut                     
0.7
5 1 1 
0.2
5                     
 
Rapeseed                    
0.7
5 1 1 
0.2
5                       
 
Cotton                   
0.7
5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0.2
5       
 
Soybean           
0.7
5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
0.2
5                     
                          Source: Gulati, A., and T. Kelley, 1999.Trade Liberalization and Indian Agriculture. Oxford University Press, New Delhi 
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS 
 
Results 
The model was run using 2004-05 observed data to provide a base year for comparison.  
The model validation run involved comparing the 2004 model results to the observed 2004 
acreages and prices.   As seen in the following table (Table C1), the model crop acreages, crop 
production and prices correspond closely with the observed values for 2004-05. 
 
The base scenario for the year 2017 makes the following assumptions: 
-The proportion of irrigated to non-irrigated land must be greater than or equal to the 
proportion observed in 2004 for all crops in all states.  
-Trade Potential: International supply elasticities of 3, demand elasticities of -1 for all tradable 
crops, sugar and alcohol 
-Crop acreage elasticity: Own price elasticity for all crops assumed to be 1, cross price elasticity 
assumed to be -0.5 
-Yield growth rate: between 2004 and 2017 the growth rate in yield is assumed to follow 
national level historical trend observed between 1950 and 2008. 
-Irrigation potential growth rate: from 2004-2017 varies between states, based on observed 
growth rate between 1985 and 2007. 
-Irrigation water requirements: remain constant between 2004 and 2017 for all crops. 
-Ethanol Feedstock: ethanol can be produced using both sugarcane juice and molasses as 
feedstock. 
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The model was subsequently run for the year 2017 under a variety of possible scenarios.   
The first scenario represents India in the year 2017 in the absence of a binding ethanol blend 
mandate.  It is assumed in this scenario that demand for fuel ethanol will be zero. The next 
scenario represents 2017 assuming that the Government of India succeeds in implementing and 
enforcing a 20% ethanol blend mandate.   According to the Planning Commission (GOI 2003) 
2017 gasoline consumption is projected to reach 22.24 billion liters, which implies that a 20% 
blend mandate would require the production of 4.45 billion liters of ethanol.  In this scenario it 
is assumed that ethanol can be produced either using sugarcane juice or molasses as feedstock.  
The final scenario assumes that India will be able to produce no more than 50% of its ethanol 
from sugarcane juice feedstock.  Indian sugar mills and distilleries currently have the capability 
to convert molasses into fuel ethanol but do not yet have the facilities required for the 
conversion of sugarcane juice directly into ethanol.  Therefore I have run a scenario which 
assumes that India will only be able to convert molasses into ethanol and not sugarcane juice 
and another that assumes India will have the capability to produce at most 50% of its fuel 
ethanol from sugarcane juice. 
 
The scenarios have been set up to vary in six main categories of assumptions: the 
potential for international trade in food commodities and alcohol, the elasticity of crop 
acreages with respect to prices, the potential for improvement in efficiency of irrigation 
systems and practices, the potential for expansion of irrigation capacity, the extent of crop yield 
increases, and the availability of sugarcane juice to ethanol conversion facilities.   
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The potential for international trade was controlled by assuming varying elasticity levels for 
international supply and demand of the modeled commodities.  High trade potential is 
represented by assigning international demand elasticities of -5 and international supply 
elasticities of 5.  Low trade potential is represented using international demand elasticities of -
0.5 and supply elasticities of 2.   
Crop acreage elasticities with respect to both own and cross-prices determine the 
flexibility in land use changes introduced by the hypothetical mix constraint.  In the low price 
response scenario hypothetical mixes are restricted altogether and only historical mixes are 
allowed by the model.  In the middle case all cross-price elasticities are fixed at -0.5 while the 
own-price elasticities are fixed at 1.  In the high responsiveness scenario all cross price 
elasticities are fixed at -1 and own-price elasticities are fixed at 2. 
One significant unknown in this study is the extent to which India’s current irrigation 
capacity will expand by 2017.  The government of India plans its irrigation infrastructural 
improvements using five-year plans.  Each of these plans sets a target for the amount of 
irrigation potential that should be created over the following five years.  The current five year 
plan covers 2007-2012 and sets a target of creating approximately 16000 hectares of new 
irrigation potential (GOI 2008c).  The current irrigation potential for all of India is 118932 
irrigable hectares of land (GOI 2008c).  The goal of the current five-year plan would thus 
constitute a 13% increase in irrigation potential.  Assuming that the next five-year plan leading 
up to 2017 would accomplish about the same, I test multiple scenarios in which I vary my 
assumptions of the irrigation potential growth rate between no growth whatsoever to an 
expansion of irrigation water availability consistent with the historical growth rate of irrigation 
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potential between 1997 and 2007.  The historical growth rates are calculated for each state 
using state level data from the Central Water Commission.  
Another possibility this study considers is that India will adopt more efficient irrigation 
systems and practices such as drip irrigation systems between now and 2017.  In order to 
account for this possibility, a scenario was run which assumed that the irrigation water 
requirements for all crops in all states will have dropped by 40% in 2017. 
 
Land 
In the base scenario, comparing the 2017 model results in the absence of an ethanol 
blend mandate with the results for 2017 in the presence of a 20% mandate, several key 
differences emerge.  As shown in Table 5.2 above, at the national level sugarcane cultivation 
increases by 28.6% with the introduction of the blend mandate while the planted acreages of 
the other model crops such as rice and wheat fall slightly overall.  Wheat and rice lose the most 
acreage of all crops with a decrease of 1.39 million hectares or 5.3% while rice falls by 1.22 
million hectares or 3.4% (see Table 5.2) suggesting that much of the new sugarcane will be 
produced on land which otherwise would have been cultivated with rice and wheat.   
The enforcement of the blend mandate causes an additional 1.19 million hectares of sugarcane 
to go into cultivation but the cultivated acreage of all other model crops falls by 2.88 million 
hectares.  Part of this discrepancy can be explained by sugarcane’s extraordinarily long growing 
season, which ranges from 9 to 16 months depending on the region where it is grown.  Because 
of India’s tropical climate, crops with short growing seasons may be cultivated multiple times or 
combined with one or two other crops on the same plot of land in a single year.  Therefore 
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substituting sugarcane for any of the other model crops comes at the cost of multiple plantings 
of those other crops. 
Although sugarcane production increases by 28.6% with the mandate, domestic sugar 
production falls 11.3% (see Table 5.3).  This results from the fact that 30.1% of domestically 
produced sugarcane is taken away from sugar production and re-allocated to fuel ethanol as a 
result of the enforcement of the blend mandate.   
Table 5.4 shows the state level sugarcane land use changes resulting from the 
implementation of the blend mandate.  At the state level, sugarcane acreage responds to the 
ethanol blend mandate with the most dramatic increases in Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra and 
Karnataka.  In Uttar Pradesh an additional 599,000 hectares of sugarcane go into production, 
amounting to an increase of 17.8% and accounting for just over half of the new land coming 
into sugarcane in response to the mandate.  In Maharashtra approximately 500,000 new 
hectares of sugarcane are added in response to the mandate, increasing the total in the state 
by more than a factor of 10 while in Karnataka sugarcane acreage increases by 86,000 hectares 
or 69%.  Tables 5.5 and 5.6 show that Uttar Pradesh also experiences the greatest losses in rice 
and wheat acreage in the presence of the blend mandate.  Specifically, rice acreage falls 22% 
and wheat falls 21% in Uttar Pradesh in response to the blend mandate.  It was expected that 
Bihar would experience increased sugarcane cultivation in response to the blend mandate 
because of its geographical similarities to Uttar Pradesh.  However sugarcane acreage did not 
increase in Bihar, most likely due to slightly lower irrigated yield levels compared to Uttar 
Pradesh and Maharashtra. 
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Assuming that Indian sugar mills and distilleries do not make the necessary capital 
investments needed to produce ethanol directly from sugarcane juice, then the only feedstock 
available for fuel ethanol production in 2017 would be sugarcane molasses.  Currently all fuel 
ethanol produced in India is made with molasses feedstock.  Running the model for 2017 with 
the blend mandate and the assumption that ethanol may only be produced using molasses 
yields an infeasible solution.  The land use changes required to produce enough sugar and its 
molasses by-product is beyond what the hypothetical mix constraint will allow.  When using the 
base scenario acreage elasticities and running the model for 2017 there is only enough land 
available for sugarcane to produce sufficient molasses to meet a 12% blend mandate.  Even 
when one allows for very high acreage elasticity values (own-price elasticity = 2, cross price 
elasticities = -1)  and trade elasticity values, only enough sugarcane to provide feedstock for a 
17% blend mandate can be produced.  Production of sufficient molasses to meet a 17% ethanol 
blend requirement would require that an additional 5.55 million hectares of land be converted 
to sugarcane cultivation.  This would more than double the amount of sugarcane projected by 
the model to be grown in 2017 in the absence of any blend mandate.  
A more realistic approach may be to assume that the Indian sugar and alcohol industries 
will be able to upgrade a proportion of their facilities for the production of ethanol from 
sugarcane juice but not all of them.  I assume that enough of these facilities will exist in 2017 to 
meet 50% of the blend mandate.  This scenario, when compared to that which allows for 
unconstrained use of sugarcane juice feedstock demands much higher total sugarcane acreage 
in 2017.  With the 50% molasses feedstock constraint in place, sugarcane acreage must be 1.18 
million hectares or 22% higher than the blend mandate scenario in the absence of the 
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feedstock constraint.  A significant portion of the extra land devoted to sugarcane is taken from 
what would otherwise have been wheat fields.  In the scenario consisting of the 2017 blend 
mandate with the 50% molasses feedstock constraint, wheat acreage is 1.58 million hectares 
(6.4%) less than the 2017 mandate scenario without the feedstock constraint.   Wheat acreage 
with the feedstock constraint is also 2.97 million hectares (11.3%) less than 2017 without the 
blend mandate.  Rice acreage falls slightly in this scenario relative to the no mandate case but is 
slightly higher than the mandate scenario without the feedstock constraint.  Rice production 
however is lowest in the feedstock constraint scenario which indicates that rice cultivation is 
increasing in lower yielding regions to compensate for sugarcane taking over formerly rice land 
in higher yielding regions. 
 
Water 
In the model base scenario, water use is limited through constraints on the maximum 
area of irrigated land in any given month and the quantity of water which may be used within a 
year in a given state.  In addition, the proportion of irrigated to non-irrigated land devoted to 
each crop is given a lower bound.  As can be seen in Table 5.7, water use for sugarcane 
increases with the introduction of the blend mandate and falls for rice and wheat.  In the base 
scenario the introduction of the blend mandate results in a 33.7% increase in water 
consumption for sugarcane cultivation over the no mandate case in 2017.  Meanwhile water 
use for rice cultivation decreases by 3.7% and water for wheat decreases by 4.5%.  When the 
50% molasses feedstock constraint is applied in addition to the blend mandate, water 
consumption by sugarcane increases by 78.3%.  Rice irrigation usage falls by 5.9% while wheat 
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irrigation falls by 12.3%.  Also shown in Table 5.7 is the quantity of water used for ethanol in 
each scenario.   This quantity represents the water used for cultivation of any additional 
sugarcane planted in response to the ethanol mandate.  According to the model, the blend 
mandate will require at least 9.15 trillion liters of water and up to 212.60 million ha cm or 21.26 
trillion liters of water if 50% of the ethanol feedstock consists of molasses. 
As discussed above, sugarcane acreage increases by 1.19 million hectares in the 
presence of the 2017 blend mandate.  All but 1000 hectares of this land, transferred from other 
crops such as wheat and rice is irrigable land.  The majority of the acreage reduction amongst 
non-sugar crops in response to the blend mandate is in the irrigated land category.  As shown in 
Table 5.8, irrigated land use by all non-sugar crops decreases by 8.4 million hectares with the 
blend mandate while non-irrigated land use falls only 2.67 million hectares.  When the 50% 
feedstock constraint is in place, irrigated land use by non-sugar crops decreases by 12.4% while 
non-irrigated land use by these crops decreases by 2.3%.  Because sugarcane is a relatively 
water intensive crop it usually requires irrigable land for cultivation.  It is evident that irrigation 
water which in the status quo would be allocated to rice, wheat and other food crops, is 
diverted to sugarcane for use in the production of ethanol as a result of the imposition of a 20% 
ethanol blend mandate.  This in turn results in reduced production of food crops either through 
reduction in average yields as is the case with rice, sorghum, groundnut, cotton and soy, or 
through reduced overall acreage due to substitution of irrigated land away from food crops 
towards sugarcane. 
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Prices and Trade 
The blend mandate leads to a large proportion of the 2017 sugarcane crop being 
allocated towards fuel ethanol production.  Sugarcane production increases as a result but not 
enough to compensate for the amount diverted to ethanol production. The resulting decrease 
in the quantity of sugarcane available for sugar production leads to an increase in both sugar 
imports and domestic sugar prices.  Specifically, sugar imports increase by 37.9% while the 
domestic price of sugar increases by 14.8% or Rs 2122.18 /metric ton (see Table 5.9).  The 
increase in sugarcane cultivation leads to a drop in domestic production of other crops.  This in 
turn results in a corresponding increase in prices of other crops, as evident in Table 5.9.  The 
price of rice increases by 3.3% in the presence of the blend mandate and by 5% with the added 
50% molasses feedstock constraint.  Wheat prices rise by 7.1% with the blend mandate and by 
17.1% with the addition of the feedstock constraint.   
The fall in production of non-sugar crops resulting from the imposition of the blend 
mandate leads to a decrease in exports of tradable agricultural commodities: rice, wheat, 
groundnut and cotton, as shown in Table 5.10 below.  Rice and wheat exports for example fall 
by 3.9% and 4.8% respectively.  With the additional feedstock constraint, exports fall by 5.9% 
for rice and 11.6% for wheat.  The trade balance was calculated for each scenario by adding the 
total value of all agricultural exports and subtracting the total value of sugar and alcohol 
imports.   In 2017 without the mandate, the trade balance totals 16.39 billion rupees.  This total 
falls by 12.35 billion rupees with the implementation of the mandate and by 28.24 billion 
rupees if 50% of the mandate must be met by molasses.   
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In the model base year, 2004 gasoline imported by India was valued at 15.86 Rs/liter 
(GOI 2006).  In 2017 gasoline consumption is projected to reach 22.24 billion liters, over 90% of 
which will consist of imports (GOI 2003).  If India were to successfully implement the 20% 
ethanol blend mandate, it would amount to an annual savings of Rs 63.48 billion on gasoline 
imports.  However, according to the trade balance results discussed above, some of these 
savings would be negated by the losses in agricultural export revenues and increased imports of 
alcohol and sugar resulting from the ethanol mandate. 
The potable and industrial alcohol industry, which depend on molasses for their 
feedstock experience an 11.3% drop in their supply of molasses as a result of the blend 
mandate.  This loss is attributed to a combination of the fall in molasses output coinciding with 
the fall in domestic sugar production and the diversion of molasses from industrial or potable 
alcohol production to fuel ethanol production in response to the blend mandate.  This 
decreased availability of molasses leads to a proportionate fall of 11.3% in the production of 
potable and industrial alcohol.  In response to this lowered production, alcohol prices increase 
from 34.6 Rs to 38.12 Rs (see Table 5.11).  With the addition of the 50% molasses feedstock 
constraint domestic alcohol production is eliminated as all molasses is diverted to fuel ethanol 
production.  All alcohol must therefore be imported, bringing alcohol imports up from 0 to 1.2 
billion liters.  Since molasses is only produced as a by-product in the sugar manufacturing 
process sugar production dramatically increases to feed the demand for molasses feedstock.  
This scenario leads to a considerable glut in sugar as production rises from 16.7 million MT 
without the mandate to 22.8 million MT with the mandate: an increase of 36.5%.  This over-
supply drives the price of sugar down 49.2%.  However because the world price of sugar is 
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extremely low compared to that of India the domestic price of sugar remains above the world 
price and exports remain at 0.  Although sugar prices fall, the cost of sugarcane production and 
the price of molasses increase.  This drives the cost of producing ethanol up from 33 Rs/liter in 
the base scenario up to 93.41 Rs/liter (see Table 5.11).  
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
Acreage elasticities in response to crop prices were set at assumed values because the 
calculation of empirical values for crop acreage elasticities was beyond the scope of this study.  
Three different levels of acreage elasticities: a low case, a base case and a high case were tested 
to get an idea of how Indian farmers’ responses to price changes will affect the impact of the 
blend mandate (see Table 5.12).  The base case sets all own price elasticities at 1 and cross 
price elasticities at -0.5.  The low case assumes all own price elasticities equal 0.5 and all cross 
price elasticities equal -0.1.  The high case assumes values of 2 for own price elasticities and -1 
for cross price elasticities.  Running the model assuming the low case leads to significantly 
reduced land use changes in response to the blend mandate in comparison to the base 
scenario.  Sugarcane acreage for example only increases by 8.2% while rice acreage decreases 
by merely 2.5% while wheat acreage actually increases slightly.  This leads to equally small price 
responses in the rice and wheat markets.  In the case of sugar however, domestic prices see a 
greater increase than in the base case: 39% compared to 14.8%.  Additionally, sugar production 
experiences a greater drop in the presence of the blend mandate: 27.3% compared to 11.3% in 
the base case.  Sugar imports increase by 37.9% in the base case but more than double in the 
low case.  These results follow from the limited growth in sugarcane acreage in response to the 
77 
 
newly introduced demand for sugarcane ethanol.  The low sensitivity to price changes amongst 
farmers does not allow for sufficient land use change to meet the blend mandate when the 50% 
molasses ethanol requirement is in place.  The assumption of high acreage elasticities allows for 
a much greater acreage response in both sugarcane and the other model crops relative to the 
other scenarios.  Sugarcane acreage increases by 30.4% while rice and wheat acreages decrease 
by 9.2% and 4.2% respectively.  The result is that sugar prices remain more stable than in either 
the base or the low case but the production of other crops, particularly rice face a greater 
decrease.  This in turn causes their prices to make a sharper increase.  Sugar prices increase by 
only 9.9% in the high case compared to 14.8% in the base case while the price of rice increases 
by a greater amount in the high case than in the base case: 6.2% versus 3.3%.  Thus, the 
magnitude of Indian farmer’s acreage responses to crop price changes determines in what 
markets the effects of the blend mandate will have the greatest negative impact.  If the acreage 
response is relatively low, the effects of the blend mandate will be felt to the greatest extent in 
the sugar and alcohol markets.  If the acreage response is higher, the impact will be greater in 
the markets for agricultural commodities other than sugarcane. 
 
One way in which India might avoid the problem of diverting water away from food 
crops to sugarcane for ethanol would be to adopt more efficient irrigation technologies and 
practices such as drip irrigation systems.  A study conducted by Narayanamoorthy (2004) 
examined the effects of drip irrigation usage on sugarcane production in Maharashtra.  His 
results suggest that drip irrigation systems use over 40% less irrigation water per hectare 
compared to the standard flood irrigation systems.   I therefore run a scenario to examine the 
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potential impacts of such improvements to current irrigation practices and systems.  This 
scenario assumes that the irrigation water requirements for all crops in all states will have 
dropped by 40% in 2017.   As expected, total water use in this scenario, with or without a blend 
mandate is approximately 27% lower than that of the base scenario (as shown in Table 5.13).  
Additionally the production of rice and wheat is higher than in the base scenario, with and 
without the mandate due to the increased availability of water.   
In the base scenario I assume that irrigation water availability in each state will increase 
according to state-wise historical irrigation potential growth rates.  When I assume instead that 
water availability stays constant between 2004 and 2017, acreage and agricultural production 
falls.  Overall acreage for all model crops is 9.7% less with the 2004 water levels than in the 
base scenario.  Rice is the most dramatically affected crop, exhibiting a decrease of 12.6% in 
acreage. These results suggest that water availability is a more highly limiting factor in crop 
production than land availability.   
 
Assumptions about trade potential between India and the rest of the world were varied 
as data on import and export supply and demand elasticities were unavailable.  In the high 
trade elasticities scenario, export demand elasticities were increased from -1 in the base 
scenario to -3 and import supply elasticities increased from 3 to 5 (see Table 5.14).  In the low 
scenario, export demand elasticities were decreased to –0.5 and import supply elasticities 
decreased to 2.  One notable effect of the higher trade elasticity is to increase the sugar import 
response to the 2017 blend mandate.  As noted above, with an international supply elasticity of 
3, imports of sugar increase by 37.9%.  With an international supply elasticity of 5, sugar 
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imports increase by 47.3% in response to the blend mandate.  With the addition of the 
constraint requiring at least 50% of the blend mandate to be met with molasses ethanol in the 
high trade elasticity scenario, sugar imports fall to 0.  Land use is not significantly affected with 
the exception of sugarcane cultivation which in the presence of the blend mandate decreases 
by 32.7% relative to the base scenario.  This is a result of dramatic increase in sugar imports.  
The assumption of higher trade elasticities also affects exports of other tradable agricultural 
commodities.  Specifically, wheat exports are higher while rice and cotton exports are 
considerably lower in 2017 with or without the blend mandate.  Additionally, all non-sugar 
agricultural commodity exports experience a much greater decrease in response to the 
application of the 50% molasses ethanol constraint.    In the low elasticity scenario, land use, 
production and prices are not significantly changed relative to the base scenario.  Rice exports 
increase slightly (10.9% in the no mandate case and 13.4% in the mandate case) while sugar 
imports see a slight decrease (11.5% in the no mandate case and 15.1% in the mandate case). 
 
There is no empirical data yet available on the cost of converting sugarcane juice into 
ethanol in India.  The value used in this model is based off of an estimate from the Indian 
National Sugar Institute (Kumar and Agrawal 2003) of the difference in conversion cost of 
ethanol from molasses compared to sugarcane juice.  According to the National Sugar Institute 
study, the ratio of the cost of sugarcane juice conversion and molasses conversion is 1.167.   
However, a study published by the USDA (USDA 2006b) reports that in the US the conversion 
cost of producing ethanol from sugarcane juice is 2.56 times greater than the conversion cost 
from molasses.  Therefore I run the model with a sugarcane juice to ethanol conversion cost 
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obtained from the USDA cost ratio and compare the results to the base scenario which uses the 
cost ratio from the National Sugar Institute study (see Table 5.15).  In the base scenario, the 
cost of sugarcane juice conversion to ethanol is fairly low so the ethanol required by the blend 
mandate is produced exclusively with sugarcane juice feedstock.  All molasses produced during 
sugar production is used for alcohol production.  On the other hand, assuming the higher cost 
for sugarcane juice conversion causes the model to allocate all molasses to ethanol production 
rather than industrial or potable alcohol.  This in turn decreases the need for sugarcane to be 
diverted away from sugar production into ethanol production.   As a result, sugar production is 
relatively unaffected in the high cost case, decreasing by only 3.1% in response to the blend 
mandate.  In the base scenario this decrease is much higher at 11.3%.  Sugarcane production 
does not require as great of an expansion (21.5%  versus 27% in the base case) in order to meet 
the mandate in the high cost scenario because of the use of both molasses and sugarcane juice 
as ethanol feedstock as opposed to the base scenario in which sugarcane juice is used 
exclusively.  In the high cost case, alcohol production falls to zero and imports rise from zero to 
1.2 billion liters with the imposition of the blend mandate due to the diversion of molasses to 
ethanol.  Thus, the extent of the cost difference between sugarcane juice and molasses ethanol 
production determines whether the impact of the blend mandate is mainly felt in the sugar 
industry or the alcohol industry. 
 
I assumed for this study that between the base year and 2017, crop yields would grow 
at a rate consistent with historical yield data from 1950 – 2007.   However, it is possible that 
crop yields will grow at an accelerated rate if the Indian government were to increase 
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investment in agricultural research and technology.  In order to test the sensitivity of the results 
to this contingency I increased the yields of all crops by 25% in a high yield scenario.  In this 
scenario, with and without the blend mandate, production of rice, wheat and sugarcane 
increase by 18 to 29% relative to the base scenario in spite of the fact that slightly less land is 
used to produce them.  Rice in the presence of the blend mandate is the one exception as its 
acreage is 1.5% higher in the high yield scenario.  However this can be explained by the 6% 
decrease in sugarcane acreage in the high yield scenario which would leave a significant 
amount of land and water available for rice cultivation.  In the high yield scenario, sugar imports 
decrease by 71% without the blend mandate and 55.4% with the blend mandate resulting from 
the increased production of sugar.  
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 Table 5.1: Model Validation 
  Acreage (1000 ha) Production (1000 MT) Prices (Rs/ton) 
  
2004 
Actual 
2004 
Model 
2004 
Actual 
2004 
Model 
2004 
Actual 
2004 
Model 
Rice 39535.01 37498.00 78133.89 75011.00 5709.72 6296.75 
Wheat 25750.00 24721.00 66608.26 65749.00 6373.46 6672.00 
Sugarcane 4157.00 3590.00 237100.00 243018.00 11913.14 9375.60 
Sorghum 9043.00 8980.00 7240.00 8528.00 5906.25 2404.34 
Corn 6535.00 6196.00 12437.01 13042.00 4853.47 4066.97 
Groundnut 6678.00 6038.00 6659.65 6846.00 15860.03 15820.50 
Rapeseed 6684.01 7299.00 7506.51 7972.00 17755.64 15715.70 
Cotton 9024.00 8284.00 2767.40 2656.00 18092.58 20519.45 
Soy 7409.00 7216.00 6770.39 6528.00 9300.00 9419.07 
 
 
Table 5.2: National Level Land Use (1000 ha) 
  Model 2005 
2017 no 
blend 
2017 20% 
blend 
2017 20% 
blend, 50% 
molasses 
Rice  37498.00 36065.00 34848.00 35989.00 
Wheat 24721.00 26225.00 24840.00 23259.00 
Sugarcane 3590.00 4158.00 5346.00 6523.00 
 
 
Table 5.3: National Level Production (Million MT) 
  
Model 
2004 
2017 no 
blend 
2017 20% 
blend 
2017 20% 
blend, 
50% 
molasses 
Rice  75.01 87.87 84.70 83.08 
Wheat 65.75 96.31 91.86 85.59 
Sugarcane 243.02 315.35 400.56 486.84 
 
83 
 
Table 5.4: State level Sugarcane Acreage (1000 ha) 
  
Model 
2004 
2017 no 
blend 
2017 20% 
blend 
2017 50% 
molasses  
Haryana 130.00 83.00 83.00 114.00 
Uttar Pradesh 1968.00 2927.00 3526.00 3679.00 
Maharashtra 320.00 47.00 546.00 903.00 
Andhra 
Pradesh 230.00 218.00 218.00 297.00 
Karnataka 170.00 125.00 211.00 397.00 
Tamil Nadu 280.00 388.00 388.00 434.00 
Bihar 100.00 45.00 45.00 190.00 
Punjab 80.00 41.00 45.00 107.00 
Assam 20.00 10.00 10.00 23.00 
Chattisgarh 9.00 14.00 14.00 19.00 
Gujarat 184.00 193.00 193.00 286.00 
Madhya 
Pradesh 60.15 38.00 38.00 38.00 
Orissa 14.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 
Rajasthan 6.26 8.00 8.00 8.00 
West Bengal 18.00 10.00 11.00 18.00 
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Table 5.5: State Level Wheat Acreage (1000 ha) 
  
Model 
2004 
2017 no 
blend 
2017 20% 
blend 
2017 50% 
molasses  
Haryana 2300.00 3611.00 3611.00 3538.00 
Uttar Pradesh 9101.00 8132.00 6422.00 5009.00 
Maharashtra 760.00 111.00 233.00 883.00 
Andhra 
Pradesh 11.00 10.00 10.00 8.00 
Karnataka 240.00 150.00 210.00 252.00 
Tamil Nadu 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Bihar 2030.00 2790.00 2791.00 2170.00 
Punjab 3470.00 4805.00 4923.00 4770.00 
Assam 60.00 31.00 31.00 58.00 
Chattisgarh 94.00 94.00 94.00 91.00 
Gujarat 570.00 1031.00 1031.00 887.00 
Madhya 
Pradesh 3690.00 3136.00 3136.00 3136.00 
Orissa 15.00 9.00 9.00 9.00 
Rajasthan 2010.00 2120.00 2120.00 2142.00 
West Bengal 371.00 194.00 216.00 328.00 
  
85 
 
Table 5.6: State Level Rice Acreage (1000 ha) 
  Model 2004 
2017 no 
blend 
2017 20% 
blend 
2017 50% 
molasses  
Haryana 1050.00 652.00 652.00 620.00 
Uttar Pradesh 4882.00 3820.00 2558.00 2978.00 
Maharashtra 1520.00 1362.00 1278.00 1056.00 
Andhra 
Pradesh 2750.00 3736.00 3736.00 3251.00 
Karnataka 1310.00 801.00 1087.00 1241.00 
Tamil Nadu 1700.00 1634.00 1634.00 1041.00 
Bihar 3120.00 1409.00 1409.00 3590.00 
Punjab 2640.00 1435.00 1303.00 1186.00 
Assam 2379.00 3019.00 3019.00 3020.00 
Chattisgarh 3640.00 3659.00 3659.00 3636.00 
Gujarat 670.00 947.00 947.00 593.00 
Madhya 
Pradesh 1660.00 1227.00 1227.00 1227.00 
Orissa 4352.00 5394.00 5394.00 5394.00 
Rajasthan 101.00 107.00 107.00 107.00 
West Bengal 5724.00 7129.00 7103.00 7047.00 
 
Table 5.7: National Level Water Use (Billion Liters) 
  
Model 
2004 
2017 no 
blend 
2017 20% 
blend 
2017 20% 
blend, 50% 
molasses 
Rice  1406.8037 1490.116 1434.697 1402.897 
Wheat 690.4609 783.7018 748.2408 687.1868 
All 
Sugarcane 272.98269 271.3812 362.8422 483.9837 
Sugarcane 
for Ethanol 0 0 91.46096 212.6024 
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Table 5.8: National Level Irrigated Land Use (1000 ha) 
  
Model 
2004 
2017 no 
blend 
2017 20% 
blend 
2017 20% 
blend, 
50% 
molasses 
Rice  21210.00 21866.00 20407.00 20372.00 
Wheat 22867.00 25649.00 24358.00 22206.00 
Sugarcane 3482.00 4141.00 5328.00 6487.00 
 
Table 5.9: Prices (Rupees/MT) 
  
Model 
2005 
2017 no 
blend 
2017 20% 
blend 
2017 20% 
blend, 
50% 
molasses 
Rice  6296.75 7025.82 7259.92 7379.49 
Wheat 6672.00 5497.09 5888.34 6438.92 
Sugar 9375.60 14334.79 16456.97 7262.70 
 
Table 5.10: Trade 
  
Model 
2004 
2017 no 
blend 
2017 20% 
blend 
2017 50% 
molasses  
Exports         
Rice (1000 MT) 2742.00 2962.00 2846.00 2787.00 
Wheat (1000 MT) 1762.00 2252.00 2144.00 1991.00 
Imports         
Sugar (1000 MT) 320.00 1498.00 2066.00 0.00 
Alcohol (million liters) 0.00 0.00 0.00 1203.00 
Trade Balance (billion 
rupees) 30.36 16.39 4.04 -11.85 
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Table 5.11: Ethanol Prices (Rupees/Liter) 
  
Model 
2004 
2017 no 
blend 
2017 20% 
blend 
2017 20% 
blend, 
50% 
molasses 
Alcohol 
(Potable/Industrial) 25.35 34.6 38.12 41.78 
Fuel Ethanol     33.00 93.41 
 
Table 5.12: Sensitivity to Acreage Elasticities (Percentage Change Relative to Base Scenario) 
Acreage Elasticities 
  
High Acreage Elasticities (2 own and -1 
cross price) 
Low Acreage Elasticities (2 own and -1 
cross price) 
  No Mandate 20% Mandate No Mandate 20% mandate 
Land Use 
Rice -5.19 -10.91 11.17 12.17 
Wheat -4.31 -3.23 7.85 15.57 
Sugarcan
e 5.60 7.07 5.22 -11.45 
Production 
Rice -4.79 -8.51 10.54 12.09 
Wheat 0.75 1.10 2.14 8.63 
Sugarcan
e 0.48 6.97 3.56 -10.59 
Sugar 4.68 9.98 3.56 -15.16 
Alcohol 4.68 9.98 3.56 -15.16 
Prices 
Rice 4.42 7.33 -9.73 -10.41 
Wheat -1.15 -1.51 -3.29 -11.81 
Sugar -6.14 -10.13 -4.68 15.39 
Alcohol -4.22 -7.27 -3.21 9.60 
Ethanol   -8.48   12.64 
Trade 
Exports 
   
  
Rice -5.20 -9.28 11.44 13.18 
Wheat 0.75 1.12 2.22 8.96 
Sugar         
Imports 
 
  
  Sugar -15.69 -21.59 -11.95 32.77 
Alcohol         
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Table 5.13: Sensitivity to Water Availability (Percentage Change Relative to Base Scenario) 
  
Irrigation Efficiency 
Improvement 
No Growth in Irrigation 
Potential 
  
No 
Mandate 
20% 
Mandate 
No 
Mandate 
20% 
mandate 
Land Use 
Rice 8.30 11.57 -12.61 -13.17 
Wheat 6.25 1.74 -2.63 -5.37 
Sugarcane 10.00 2.15 -3.63 -6.73 
Production 
Rice 17.92 18.89 -11.82 -13.76 
Wheat 5.80 4.07 -5.27 -5.64 
Sugarcane 9.95 2.64 -4.11 -7.28 
Sugar 9.95 3.77 -4.11 -10.42 
Alcohol 9.95 3.77 -4.11 -10.43 
Water 
Total -27.34 -26.71 -13.04 -14.00 
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Table 5.14: Sensitivity to Trade elasticities (Percentage Change Relative to Base Scenario) 
Trade 
  
High Trade Elasticities (5 import and -3 
export) 
Low Trade Elasticities (2 import and -0.5 
export) 
  No Mandate 20% Mandate No Mandate 20% mandate 
Land Use 
Rice -0.14 -0.12 -0.09 0.15 
Wheat 0.79 1.34 -0.33 -0.76 
Sugarcane -0.99 -1.44 0.72 0.39 
Production 
Rice -0.48 -0.15 0.06 0.14 
Wheat 0.97 1.17 -0.31 -0.66 
Sugarcane -0.93 -32.68 0.67 0.37 
Sugar 0.00 0.00 1.62 2.50 
Alcohol 0.00 0.00 1.62 2.50 
Prices 
Rice -0.87 -1.33 0.29 0.27 
Wheat -0.68 -1.15 0.29 0.81 
Sugar -0.17 -2.65 0.65 2.24 
Alcohol 0.84 1.39 -0.61 -0.39 
Ethanol   -1.73   1.55 
Trade 
Exports 
   
  
Rice  -100.00 -48.98 10.87 13.35 
Wheat  -22.42 -88.53 -5.51 -3.45 
Sugar          
Imports 
   
  
Sugar  19.09 27.15 -11.48 -15.10 
Alcohol          
Trade Balance 88.39 -760.54 26.29 180.89 
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Table 5.15: Sensitivity to Sugarcane Ethanol Conversion Cost (Percentage Change Relative to 
Base Scenario) 
 
Sugarcane to Ethanol Conversion Cost 
High Sugarcane Ethanol Cost 
  
No 
Mandate 
20% 
Mandate 
Land Use 
Rice 0.00 0.33 
Wheat 0.00 1.19 
Sugarcane 0.00 -4.68 
Production 
Rice 0.00 0.15 
Wheat 0.00 1.09 
Sugarcane 0.00 -4.36 
Sugar 0.00 9.23 
Alcohol 0.00 -100.00 
Prices 
Rice 0.00 -0.13 
Wheat 0.00 -1.50 
Sugar 0.00 -9.37 
Alcohol 0.00 9.60 
Ethanol   37.79 
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Table 5.16: Sensitivity to Yield Growth Rate (Percentage Change Relative to Base Scenario) 
Yield 
High Yield (25% higher yield) 
  
No 
Mandate 
20% 
Mandate 
Land Use 
Rice -1.93 1.45 
Wheat -4.91 -4.04 
Sugarcane -2.41 -5.99 
Production 
Rice 28.95 28.17 
Wheat 18.34 19.65 
Sugarcane 21.13 17.90 
Sugar 21.13 25.62 
Alcohol 21.13 25.62 
Prices 
Rice -26.72 -24.26 
Wheat -28.21 -26.91 
Sugar -27.76 -26.01 
Alcohol -19.08 -18.63 
Ethanol   -21.76 
Trade 
Exports 
 
  
Rice 31.47 30.71 
Wheat 19.05 20.43 
Sugar     
Imports 
 
  
Sugar -71.03 -55.42 
Alcohol     
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                  CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION 
 
The model results have several policy implications for the Indian bioenergy program and 
ethanol targets.   In the base year, 2004 gasoline imported by India was valued at 15.86 Rs/liter 
(GOI 2006).  In 2017 gasoline consumption is projected to reach 22.24 billion liters, over 90% of 
which will consist of imports according to the Planning Commission of the Government of India 
(GOI 2003).  If India were to successfully implement the 20% ethanol blend mandate, it would 
amount to an annual savings of 63.48 billion rupees on gasoline imports.  However this is not 
the whole story.  These benefits are diminished by several negative impacts of the blend 
mandate policy.  First of all the trade benefits are partly balanced by trade losses in the 
agricultural sector.  These losses amount to approximately 7.74 billion rupees, just from the 
model crops.  In the model these losses stem from lost exports of rice, wheat and groundnut 
and increased imports of sugar.   Other losses to the Indian economy come in the form of 
reduced agricultural production.  In the base scenario, production of all model crops (with the 
exception of cotton, which increases slightly) falls as a result of the blend mandate.  Sugar and 
alcohol production also decreases due to the diversion of sugarcane towards ethanol 
production.  Altering the various model assumptions such as acreage elasticities, trade 
elasticities, and yield and water growth showed that these losses were unavoidable.  Varying 
the assumptions only served to redistribute the mandate’s impact amongst the various 
markets. 
 Although India may be able to avoid importing approximately 4 billion liters of gasoline 
on an annual basis by replacing it with sugarcane ethanol, it will be in effect trading water for 
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gasoline.  According to my model the blend mandate will require at least 9.15 trillion liters of 
water in the base scenario and up to 21.26 trillion liters if 50% of the ethanol feedstock consists 
of molasses.  In terms of liters of water per liter of ethanol produced, this would amount to 
2056 liters of water/ liter of ethanol in the base scenario and 4778 liters of water/ liter of 
ethanol in the 50% molasses feedstock scenario. 
At present ethanol is not economically competitive with gasoline.   According to data 
from the Indian Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas in 2004-05 India was paying 15.86 
Rs/liter for gasoline on the international market while ethanol cost 25.35 Rs/liter to produce 
domestically from molasses feedstock.  In 2017 molasses ethanol is projected by the model to 
cost at least 34.6 Rs/liter to produce.   Thus, unless oil prices more than double between 2004 
and 2017, the Indian government will need to subsidize ethanol production in order to meet 
the mandate.   Sugarcane ethanol would be slightly more cost effective to produce at 33 
Rs/liter.  But this assumes that the Indian sugar and alcohol industry would be capable of 
producing it by 2017.  Currently Indian distilleries are only able to produce ethanol from 
sugarcane molasses.  Equipping distilleries to process crushed sugarcane directly into ethanol 
would require a capital investment.  The Indian government would need to subsidize this 
transition or somehow make it worthwhile to alcohol producers or molasses ethanol will be the 
only available option.  When I assumed that the alcohol industry would be able to produce only 
50% of the blend mandate using sugarcane as feedstock the model predicted that sugar 
production would increase just for the sake of supplying enough molasses to fulfill the 
mandate.  This leads to a glut of sugar and a steep drop in the sugar price.  Additionally the cost 
94 
 
of producing ethanol becomes significantly higher due to the higher cost of sugarcane and 
molasses. 
Were the Indian government to exercise control over where the expansion of sugarcane 
cultivation for ethanol production is to take place, the model seems to suggest that Uttar 
Pradesh would be the preferred location.  This result is consistent with expectations as Uttar 
Pradesh has the lowest water irrigation requirements for sugarcane out of all the model states, 
it has a relatively short growing season of 10 months and its costs of production are low.  
 
The data available for use in this study was not ideal.  The sensitivity analysis showed 
that several key assumptions made due to lack of data have a significant impact on varying 
aspects of the results.  The assumption of the magnitude of Indian farmer’s acreage responses 
to crop price changes determines in what markets the effects of the blend mandate will have 
the greatest negative impact.  Specifically if lower acreage elasticities are assumed, the sugar 
and alcohol markets are most affected.  However with higher acreage elasticities, the impact is 
greatest on the markets for the other agricultural commodities.  I assumed that irrigation 
efficiency would remain constant but it is possible that technologies such as drip irrigation 
would be widely implemented by 2017 and irrigation efficiency would improve considerably.  
This would significantly decrease water use on a per hectare basis and increase crop production 
relative to my model’s base scenario.  In the base scenario I assume that irrigation water 
availability in each state will increase according to state-wise historical irrigation potential 
growth rates.  When I assume instead that water availability stays constant between 2004 and 
2017, agricultural land use and agricultural production falls.  Data on import and export supply 
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and demand elasticities were unavailable so I tested the model’s sensitivity to import supply 
and export demand elasticity assumptions.  Higher elasticities significantly increase sugar 
imports, leading to decreased domestic production.  There is no empirical data yet available on 
the cost of converting sugarcane juice into ethanol in India.   The value used in this model is 
based off of an estimate from the Indian National Sugar Institute (Kumar and Agrawal 2003), 
however the value reported in a study published by the USDA (USDA 2006) was significantly 
higher.  In the sensitivity analysis I found that extent of the cost difference between sugarcane 
juice and molasses ethanol production determines whether the impact of the blend mandate is 
mainly felt in the sugar industry or the alcohol industry.   
The lack of data also limited the feasible scope of the study.  I would have liked to split 
the agricultural markets into individual state markets because each state has its own 
agricultural policies dealing with subsidies and pricing.  However there was insufficient state 
level data for this.  In addition I did not have sufficient data to examine social welfare effects 
and the welfare effects in particular of input subsidies on fertilizer, water and electricity.   This 
would have required data on domestic markets for inputs which was not available to us.   
If the Government of India hopes to successfully reach their ethanol blend goal for 2017 
with a minimum of negative side effects to the rest of its economy, my model results suggest 
that it will need to convert its ethanol industry from one dependent solely on sugarcane 
molasses to one based primarily on sugarcane juice.   My results suggest also that negative 
impacts to the domestic sugar and alcohol industry and agricultural markets are unavoidable.  
However these impacts can be lessened through investment in crop production technology and 
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agricultural infrastructure to improve yields and improvements to irrigation systems to increase 
availability of water or reduce water requirements for farmers. 
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APPENDIX A: MODEL 
 
List of Acronyms 
Indices 
 𝑉 = {v} all crop activities 
 𝐶 = {c} all crops 
𝑅 = {r} region (Indian state) 
 𝑇 = {t} time (month) 
 𝐼 = {i} irrigated crop activities (subset of A) 
 𝑁 = {n} non-irrigated crop activities (subset of A) 
𝑆 = {s} sugarcane activities (subset of A) 
 
Parameters 
ya,r  yield of crop activity A in region R (MT/ha) 
ca,r  cost of crop activity A in region R (Rupees/ha) 
la,t,r  monthly land requirements of each crop activity A in region R 
wr,ir  water requirements of irrigated crops IR (ha cm) 
Ir  irrigable land availability in region R (ha) 
Nr  non- irrigable land availability in region R (ha) 
Wr  irrigation water availability in region R (ha cm) 
b  blend mandate of ethanol in fuel 
Hhi  historical acreage (ha) 
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Hhy  hypothetical acreage (ha) 
𝛑  proportion of irrigated to non-irrigated land 
𝜂𝑐
𝑠𝑐  conversion factor: sugarcane to crushed cane (MT to MT) 
𝜂𝑠
𝑐  conversion factor: crushed cane to sugar (MT to MT) 
𝜂𝑚
𝑐   conversion factor: crushed cane to molasses (MT to liters) 
𝜂𝑒
𝑐  conversion factor: crushed cane to ethanol (MT to liters) 
𝜂𝑒
𝑚  conversion factor: molasses to ethanol (MT to liters) 
𝜂𝑎
𝑚  conversion factor: molasses to alcohol (MT to liters) 
𝜃𝑠
𝑐  conversion cost: crushed cane to sugar (Rupees/ton) 
𝜃𝑒
𝑐  conversion cost: crushed cane to ethanol (Rupees/liter) 
𝜃𝑒
𝑚  conversion cost: molasses to ethanol (Rupees/liter) 
 
Variables 
Ha,r   hectares of crop activity A in region R 
Dc   quantity of crop C demanded (MT) 
Ec   quantity of crop C exported (MT) 
Ic   quantity of crop C imported (MT) 
Cs  quantity of sugarcane used for sugar (MT) 
Ce   quantity of sweet sugarcane used for ethanol (MT) 
Me  quantity of molasses used for ethanol (MT) 
Ma  quantity of molasses used for alcohol (MT) 
S  quantity of sugar demanded domestically (MT) 
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Es  quantity of sugar demanded for export (MT) 
IS  quantity of sugar demanded for import (MT) 
F  quantity of fuel (gasoline engine) demanded (liters) 
ET  quantity of ethanol demanded (liters) 
ETm  quantity of ethanol produced from molasses (liters) 
A  quantity of alcohol (potable and industrial) demanded (liters) 
Ia  quantity of alcohol imported (liters) 
Pc  endogenous price of crop NC (Rupees/ton) 
Pwnc  endogenous export price of crop NC (Rupees /ton) 
Ps  endogenous price of sugar (Rupees /ton) 
Pf  endogenous price of fuel (Rupees /liter) 
Pa  endogenous price of alcohol (Rupees /liter) 
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GAMS Model: 2017 Base Scenario 
 
SET A activity: all crops non-irrigated irrigated 
            /ricekn, riceki, ricern, riceri, wheatn, wheati, 
             sugarcanen, sugarcanei, 
             sorghumkn, sorghumki, sorghumrn, sorghumri, 
             cornkn, cornki, cornrn, cornri, 
             groundkn, groundki, groundrn, groundri, rapen, rapei, 
             cottonn, cottoni, soyn, soyi/ 
    C crop  /rice, wheat, sugarcane, sorghum, corn, ground, 
             rape, cotton, soy/ 
    NC(C) normal crops /rice, wheat, sorghum, corn, ground, 
             rape, cotton, soy/ 
    R state /Haryana, UttarPradesh, Maharashtra, AndhraPradesh, 
             Karnataka, TamilNadu, Bihar, Punjab, Assam, Chattisgarh, Gujarat, 
             MadhyaPradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan, WestBengal/ 
    T month /Jan, Feb, Mar, Apr, May, Jun, Jul, Aug, Sep, Oct, Nov, Dec/ 
    Y year /2001, 2002, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007/ 
    IR(A) /riceki, riceri, wheati, sugarcanei, sorghumki, sorghumri, 
             cornki, cornri, groundki, groundri, rapei, 
             cottoni, soyi/ 
    NIR(A) /ricekn, ricern, wheatn, sugarcanen, sorghumkn, sorghumrn, 
             cornkn, cornrn, groundkn, groundrn, rapen, 
             cottonn, soyn/ 
    NW(C) /rice, wheat, ground, cotton/  ; 
 
PARAMETER baseprice1(C) price of crop NC in 2004 (Rs per tonne) 
                  /rice 5709.72, wheat 6373.46, sorghum 5906.25, corn 4853.47, 
                   ground 15860.03, rape 17755.64, cotton 18092.58, 
                   soy 9300/ 
          basequant(C)  quantity of crop C demanded domestically in 2017 (1000 tonnes) 
                  /rice 102088, wheat 84323.1, sorghum 8165.31, 
                   corn 18453.4, ground 6775.55, 
                   rape 6938.77, cotton 4134.21, soy 14761.7/ 
          basepricee(C) export price of crop NC in 2004(Rs per tonne) 
                  /rice 7288.27, wheat 7265.14, sorghum 0, corn 0, 
                   ground 30878.9, rape 0, cotton 48774.2, soy 0/ 
          basepricei(C) import price of crop NC in 2004 (Rs per tonne) 
                  /rice 8722.31, wheat 9623.21, sorghum 0, corn 0, 
                   ground 30878.9, rape 0, cotton 59143.8, soy 0/ 
          basequante(C) quantity of crop C demanded for export in 2004 (1000 tonnes) 
                  /rice 3615.1, wheat 2009.35, sorghum 0, 
                   corn 0, ground 177.15, 
                   rape 0, cotton 86.64, soy 0/ 
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          basequanti(C) quantity of crop C demanded for import in 2004 (1000 tonnes) 
                  /rice 0.001, wheat 0.001, sorghum 0, corn 0, 
                   ground 0.001, rape 0, 
                   cotton 0.001, soy 0/ 
          elastD(C) domestic elasticity of demand for crop NC 
                  /rice -0.73, wheat -0.84, sorghum -0.30, 
                   corn -0.30, ground -0.54, 
                   rape -0.54, cotton -0.5, soy -0.54/; 
 
*  prices in Rs/ton all quantities in million MT -> all values in million Rs 
          basequant(C)=  basequant(C)/1000; 
          basequante(C)= basequante(C)/1000; 
          basequanti(C)= basequanti(C)/1000; 
          elaste(C)= -1; 
          elasti(C)=  3; 
 
parameter 
          exmargin(C) export margin for crop C 
          impmargin(C) import margin for crop C 
          aD(NC) coefficient of domestic demand function for crop NC 
          bD(NC) 
          ae(NW) intercept of export demand function for crop NC 
          be(NW) slope of export demand function for crop NC 
          ai(NW) intercept of import supply function for crop NC 
          bi(NW) slope of import supply function for crop NC; 
                 aD(NC) = baseprice1(NC)*(1-1/elastd(NC)); 
                 bD(NC) = -baseprice1(NC)/(basequant(NC)*elastd(NC)); 
                 ae(NW) = basepricee(NW)*(1-1/elaste(NW)); 
                 be(NW) = -basepricee(NW)/(basequante(NW)*elaste(NW)); 
                 ai(NW) = basepricei(NW)*(1-1/elasti(NW)); 
                 bi(NW) = basepricei(NW)/(basequanti(NW)*elasti(NW)); 
                 exmargin(NW) = basepricee(NW) - baseprice1(NW); 
                 impmargin(NW) = basepricei(NW) - baseprice1(NW); 
 
display exmargin,  impmargin; 
 
parameter water(R) irrigation water availability in region R (1000 ha cm) 
             /Haryana       175100,     UttarPradesh  603500, 
              Maharashtra   172700, 
              AndhraPradesh 479200,     Karnataka     211500, 
              TamilNadu     269800,     Bihar         210000, 
              Punjab        215600,     Assam         17000, 
              Chattisgarh   55000,      Gujarat       182500, 
              MadhyaPradesh 124300,     Orissa        112500, 
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              Rajasthan     176900,     WestBengal    260400/; 
         water(R)= water(R)/1000 
 
scalar    blend required percentage of ethanol in fuel /0.20/ 
          convsccc conversion factor sugarcane to crushed cane/.5262/ 
          convccs conversion factor crushed cane to sugar /0.1017/ 
          convccm conversion factor crushed cane to molasses /0.044/ 
          convcce conversion factor crushed cane to ethanol (tonnes to l) 
                  /70/ 
          convme  conversion factor molasses to ethanol (tonnes to l) /225.225/ 
          convma  conversion factor molasses to alcohol (tonnes to l) /213.96/ 
          costccs cost of conversion of crushed cane to sugar (Rs per tonne) 
                  /4168.6/ 
          costcce cost of conversion of crushed cane to ethanol (Rs per l) 
                  /11.32/ 
          costme cost of conversion of molasses to ethanol (Rs per l) 
                  /9.7/ 
          costma cost of conversion of molasses to alcohol (Rs per l) 
                  /9.7/ 
          costg cost of refinement of gasoline (Rs per l) /14.44/ 
          elastsd elasticity of domestic demand for sugar /-0.39/ 
          elastse elasticity of world demand for sugar /-1/ 
          elastsi elasticity of world supply for sugar to India /3/ 
          elasta elasticity of domestic demand for alcohol /-0.545/ 
          elastai elasticity of supply of alcohol imports /3/ 
          elastf elasticity of domestic demand for gasoline /-0.21/ 
          basepricesd price of sugar in 2004 (Rs per tonne) /12219.33/ 
          basequantsd quantity of sugar demanded in 2017 (1000 tonnes) 
                  /19704.8/ 
          basepricesi import price of sugar in 2004 (Rs per tonne) 
                  /10465.7/ 
          basequantsi base quantity of sugar imports 2004 (Rs per tonne) /932.74/ 
          basepricese export price of sugar in 2004 (Rs per tonne) /7118.199/ 
          basequantse base quantity of sugar exports 2004 (Rs per tonne) /0.001/ 
          basepricea price of alcohol in 2004 (Rs per l) /23.220/ 
          basequanta quantity of alcohol demanded in 2017 (1000 l) /2131560/ 
          basequantai quantity of aclohol imported in 2004 (1000l) /0.001/ 
          basepricef price of fuel (gasoline engine) in 2004 (Rs per l) /14.44/ 
          basequantf quantity of fuel (gasoline engine) demanded in 2017 (1000l) 
                  /22238400/ 
          importpricea import price of alcohol in 2004 (Rs per l) /32.5/ 
 
          asugari intercept of import supply function for sugar 
          bsugari slope of import supply function for sugar 
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          asugare intercept of export demand for sugar 
          bsugare slope of export demand for sugar 
          asugard 
          bsugard 
          aalcohol 
          balcohol 
          aalcoholi intercept of import supply function for alcohol 
          balcoholi slope of import supply function for alcohol 
          afuel coefficient of domestic demand for fuel (gasoline engine) 
          sugexmargin 
          sugimpmargin 
          aimpmargin  ; 
 
all prices in Rs/ton all quantities in million MT; all values in million Rs 
        basequantsd=   basequantsd/1000; 
        basequantsi= basequantsi/1000; 
        basequantse= basequantse/1000; 
        basequanta= basequanta/1000; 
        basequantai=basequantai/1000; 
        basequantf=  basequantf/1000; 
                 sugexmargin =basepricese - basepricesd ; 
                 sugimpmargin =basepricesd - basepricesi ; 
                 aimpmargin = importpricea - basepricea; 
                 asugari = basepricesi*(1-1/elastsi); 
                 bsugari = basepricesi/(basequantsi*elastsi); 
                 asugare = basepricese*(1-1/elastse); 
                 bsugare = -basepricese/(basequantse*elastse); 
                 asugard = basepricesd*(1-1/elastsd); 
                 bsugard =  -basepricesd/(basequantsd*elastsd); 
                 aalcohol = basepricea*(1-1/elasta); 
                 balcohol = -basepricea/(basequanta*elasta); 
                 aalcoholi = importpricea*(1-1/elastai); 
                 balcoholi = importpricea/(basequantai*elastai); 
 
parameter tradable(C); tradable(NC)=0; tradable(NW)=1; 
 
histacre(Y,R,C)= histacre(Y,R,C)/1000; 
histacreirr(Y,R,C)= histacreirr(Y,R,C)/1000; 
hyacre(N,R,C)= hyacre(N,R,C)/1000; 
hyacreirr(N,R,C)= hyacreirr(N,R,C)/1000; 
 
variable totalminland 
positive variable ITOTLAND(R), DTOTLAND(R), HECTARES1(A,R) 
equation minlanobj 
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         ILandCon(T,R) 
         DLandCon(T,R) 
         KNOWNLAND(R,C) 
         RATIO(R,C); 
 
  minlanobj.. totalminland=e=sum(R, ITOTLAND(R) + DTOTLAND(R) ) ; 
  ILandCon(T,R).. Sum(IR, landreq(IR,T,R)* HECTARES1(IR,R))  =L= ITOTLAND(R); 
  DLandCon(T,R).. Sum(NIR, landreq(NIR,T,R)* HECTARES1(NIR,R))  =L= DTOTLAND(R); 
  KNOWNLAND(R,C).. Sum(A, cropcommap2(A,C)*HECTARES1(A,R))=e=histacre('2004',R,C); 
  RATIO(R,C)..    SUM(IR, cropcommap2(IR,C)*HECTARES1(IR,R))  =e=  irrate(R,C)* 
histacre('2004',R,C)  ; 
 
model region / minlanobj ,  ILandCon, DLandCon, KNOWNLAND, RATIO / 
solve   region minimizing  totalminland using lp; 
 
yield('sugarcanen','Maharashtra') = 0; 
 
set iter1 /i1*i3/ 
    N    /N1*N19683/ 
 
alias (iter1, iter2, iter3, iter4, iter5, iter6, iter7, iter8, iter9), (C,C1) 
 
table  hprice(C,iter1) alternative prices (Rs per ton) 
              i1      i2      i3 
rice         6000    7500    9000 
wheat        6500    8500    10500 
sugarcane    795     1000    1500 
sorghum      5250    6800    7800 
corn         5400    6700    8000 
ground       15200   18000   22500 
rape         17150   21000   25000 
cotton       18600   22000   27000 
soy          10100   12500   15000 
 
 
parameter hyprice(C)       hypothetical prices 
          hyacre(N,R,C)  hypothetical acres for each crop 
          hyacreirr(N,R,C) hypothetical irrigated acres; 
 
parameter baseacre(R,C), baseacreirr(R,C), baseprice(C), const(R,C),hypacre(R,C); 
baseacre(R,C)=acreage(R,C); 
baseacreirr(R,C)=irracreage(R,C); 
baseprice(C)=hprice(C,'i1'); 
const(R,C)$baseacre(R,C)  =   Log(baseacre(R,C))- 
117 
 
         sum(C1,REGELAST(C,C1)*log(baseprice(C)) ); 
scalar k /0/; 
 
parameter    percchangeacre(N,R,C); 
 
loop(iter1, hyprice('rice')  =hprice('rice',iter1); 
  loop(iter2, hyprice('wheat')  =hprice('wheat',iter2); 
     loop(iter3, hyprice('sugarcane')  =hprice('sugarcane',iter3); 
        loop(iter4, hyprice('sorghum')  =hprice('sorghum',iter4); 
           loop(iter5, hyprice('corn')  =hprice('corn',iter5); 
              loop(iter6, hyprice('ground')  =hprice('ground',iter6); 
                 loop(iter7, hyprice('rape')  =hprice('rape',iter7); 
                    loop(iter8, hyprice('cotton')  =hprice('cotton',iter8); 
                       loop(iter9, hyprice('soy')  =hprice('soy',iter9); 
       k=k+1; 
 
    percchangeacre(N,R,C)$(ord(N) eq k and acreage(R,C))= 
        sum(C1,REGELAST(C,C1)*( hyprice(C1)/hprice(C1,'i1')-1) ); 
 
))))))))); 
    hyacre(N,R,C)=(1+ percchangeacre(N,R,C))* baseacre(R,C); 
    hyacreirr(N,R,C)=(1+ percchangeacre(N,R,C))* baseacreirr(R,C); 
 
parameter maxhypacre(R,c), minhypacre(R,c) ; 
          maxhypacre(R,c)=smax(N,hyacre(N,R,C)); 
          minhypacre(R,c)= smin(N,hyacre(N,R,C)); 
 
display      maxhypacre, minhypacre; 
 
variable TWEL total welfare from food and miles; 
 
positive variables HECTARES(A,R) hectares of crop A in region R 
                   CROPDEM(C) quantity of crop NC demanded 
                   EXPORT(C) quantity of crop NC exported 
                   IMPORT(C) quantity of crop NC imported 
                   CANE4S quantity of sugarcane used for sugar 
                   CANE4E quantity of sugarcane used for ethanol 
                   MOLASSES4E quantity of molasses used for ethanol 
                   MOLASSES4A quantity of molasses used for alchol 
                   MOLASSES4FEED quantity of molasses used for animal feed or other uses 
                   SUGAR quantity of sugar demanded domestically 
                   EXPORTSUGAR quantity of sugar demanded for export 
                   IMPORTSUGAR quantity of sugar imported 
                   GAS quantity of gasoline demanded 
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                   ETHANOL quantity of ethanol demanded 
                   MOLETHANOL quantity of ethanol produced from molasses 
                   ALCOHOL quantity of alcohol demanded 
                   IMPORTALCOHOL quantity of alcohol imported 
                   LAMDA(Y,R) weight historical mixes 
                   BETA(N,R) weight hypothetical mixes 
                  ; 
 
equation Obj objective function 
         BalanceN(NC) material balance constraint for normal crops 
         BalanceSugarcane material balance constraint for sugarcane 
         NonIrrLandCon(T,R) nonirrigated land availability constraint 
         IrrLandCon(T,R) irrigated land availability constraint 
         WaterCon(R) irrigation water availability constraint 
         BalanceSugar material balance for sugar 
         BlendEthanol fuel ethanol blend mandate 
         BalanceMolasses material balance constraint for molasses 
         BalanceMolethanol material balance constraint for molasses based fuel ethanol 
         BalanceEthanol  material balance constraint for fuel ethanol 
         BalanceAlcohol material balance constraint for alcohol 
         HistHypoMix(R,C) hypothetical mix constraint 
         Weights(R)  
         Irrigation(R,C) constraint on proportion of irrigated to non-irrigated land 
                   ; 
 
Obj.. TWEL =E= 
         sum(NC,CROPDEM(NC)*(aD(NC)-0.5*bD(NC)*CROPDEM(NC))) + 
         sum(NW,EXPORT(NW)*(ae(NW)-0.5*be(NW)*EXPORT(NW)-exmargin(NW))) - 
         sum(NW,IMPORT(NW)*basepricei(NW)+impmargin(NW)) + 
         SUGAR*(asugard-0.5*bsugard*SUGAR)  + 
         EXPORTSUGAR*(basepricese)  + 
         ALCOHOL*(aalcohol-0.5*balcohol*ALCOHOL) - 
         sum((A,R),HECTARES(A,R)*costc(A,R)) - 
         CANE4S*convsccc*convccs*costccs - 
         MOLASSES4E*convme*costme - MOLASSES4A*convma*costma - 
         CANE4E*convsccc*convcce*costcce - 
         IMPORTSUGAR*(asugari+0.5*bsugari*IMPORTSUGAR+sugimpmargin) - 
         IMPORTALCOHOL*(importpricea+aimpmargin) 
; 
 
BalanceN(NC).. CROPDEM(NC) + EXPORT(NC)$Tradable(NC) =L= 
         Sum((R,A),CropComMap(A,NC)*yield(A,R)*HECTARES(A,R)) + 
         IMPORT(NC)$Tradable(NC); 
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BalanceSugarcane.. CANE4S+CANE4E =L= 
         sum(R,yield('sugarcanen',R)*HECTARES('sugarcanen',R) + 
         yield('sugarcanei',R)*HECTARES('sugarcanei',R)); 
 
 
NonIrrLandCon(T,R).. Sum(NIR, landreq(NIR,T,R)* HECTARES(NIR,R)) + 
Sum(IR, landreq(IR,T,R)* HECTARES(IR,R)) =L= DTOTLAND(R) + ITOTLAND(R); 
 
IrrLandCon(T,R).. Sum(IR, landreq(IR,T,R)* HECTARES(IR,R)) =L= ITOTLAND(R); 
 
WaterCon(R)..Sum(IR, waterreq(R,IR)*HECTARES(IR,R)) =L= water(R); 
 
BalanceSugar.. SUGAR+EXPORTSUGAR  =L= CANE4S*convsccc*convccs + IMPORTSUGAR; 
 
BalanceAlcohol..ALCOHOL =L= MOLASSES4A*convma + IMPORTALCOHOL; 
 
BalanceMolasses.. MOLASSES4E + MOLASSES4A =L= CANE4S*convsccc*convccm; 
 
BlendEthanol.. ETHANOL =E= blend*basequantf; 
 
BalanceMolethanol.. MOLETHANOL =L= MOLASSES4E*convme; 
 
BalanceEthanol..CANE4E*convsccc*convcce + MOLETHANOL 
         =E= ETHANOL; 
 
HistHypoMix(R,C)..sum(A,cropcommap2(A,C)*HECTARES(A,R)) =E= 
                 sum(Y, LAMDA(Y,R)*histacre(Y,R,C)) + 
                 sum(N, BETA(N,R)*hyacre(N,R,C)); 
 
Irrigation(R,C)..sum(A,cropcommap2irr(A,C)*HECTARES(A,R)) =G= 
irrate(R,C)*sum(A,cropcommap2(A,C)*HECTARES(A,R)); 
 
Weights(R)..sum(Y, LAMDA(Y,R))+sum(N, BETA(N,R)) =e= 1; 
 
model IndiaFoodFuel /all/; 
 
solve IndiaFoodFuel using NLP maximizing TWEL;
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APPENDIX B: RESULTS 
 
Table B.1: National Level Results 
  
2004 
Actual 
Model 
2004 
2017 no 
blend 
2017 20% 
blend 
2017 50% 
molasses  
Acreage (1000 ha)           
Rice 39535.01 37498.00 36065.00 34848.00 35989.00 
Wheat 25750.00 24721.00 26225.00 24840.00 23259.00 
Sugarcane 4157.00 3590.00 4158.00 5346.00 6523.00 
Sorghum 9043.00 8980.00 4826.00 4818.00 6455.00 
Corn 6535.00 6196.00 6097.00 5858.00 5201.00 
Groundnut 6678.00 6038.00 6196.00 6024.00 5176.00 
Rapeseed 6684.01 7299.00 6630.00 6499.00 6191.00 
Cotton 9024.00 8284.00 5446.00 5737.00 7058.00 
Soy 7409.00 7216.00 9519.00 9497.00 9840.00 
All non-sugar 110658.02 106232.00 101004.00 98121.00 99169.00 
Acreage Irrigated (1000 ha)           
Rice 22442.67 21210.00 21866.00 20407.00 20372.00 
Wheat 23572.57 22867.00 25649.00 24358.00 22206.00 
Sugarcane 3802.81 3482.00 4141.00 5328.00 6487.00 
Sorghum 816.22 1333.00 3020.00 2748.00 2185.00 
Corn 1486.39 2049.00 4729.00 4682.00 4171.00 
Groundnut 1270.55 1443.00 1402.00 1341.00 1149.00 
Rapeseed 4798.84 5738.00 6192.00 661.00 5843.00 
Cotton 3124.10 2461.00 3841.00 4118.00 4025.00 
Soy 93.93 132.00 2703.00 2683.00 816.00 
All non-sugar 57605.26 57233.00 69402.00 60998.00 60767.00 
Acreage Non-Irrigated 
(1000 ha)           
Rice 17092.34 16288.00 14199.00 14441.00 15617.00 
Wheat 2177.43 1854.00 576.00 482.00 1053.00 
Sugarcane 354.19 108.00 17.00 18.00 36.00 
Sorghum 8226.78 7647.00 1806.00 2070.00 4270.00 
Corn 5048.61 4147.00 1368.00 1176.00 1030.00 
Groundnut 5407.45 4595.00 4794.00 4683.00 4027.00 
Rapeseed 1885.17 1561.00 438.00 5838.00 348.00 
Cotton 5899.90 5823.00 1605.00 1619.00 3033.00 
Soy 7315.08 7084.00 6816.00 6814.00 9024.00 
All non-sugar 53052.76 48999.00 31602.00 37123.00 38402.00 
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Table B.1 (cont.) 
 
Total Water Consumption 
(1000 ha cms) 2659300.00 2659300.00 3057912.00 3055242.00 2988594.00 
            
Exports (1000 MT)           
Rice  3615.10 2742.00 2962.00 2846.00 2787.00 
Wheat 2009.35 1762.00 2252.00 2144.00 1991.00 
Groundnut 177.15 178.00 185.00 178.00 152.00 
Cotton 86.64 74.00 64.00 65.00 67.00 
Sugar  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Alcohol            
            
Imports (1000 MT)           
Rice            
Wheat            
Groundnut           
Cotton           
Sugar  932.74 320.00 1498.00 2066.00 0.00 
Alcohol  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1203000.00 
            
Prices (Rs./ton or Rs/liter)           
Rice 5709.72 6296.75 7025.82 7259.92 7379.49 
Wheat 6373.46 6672.00 5497.09 5888.34 6438.92 
Sugarcane 5906.25 2404.34 6314.13 7011.94 5899.74 
Sorghum 4853.47 4066.97 5641.63 6020.28 8187.68 
Corn 15860.03 15820.50 14563.94 15719.83 20167.70 
Groundnut 17755.64 15715.70 10582.84 11304.64 13319.11 
Rapeseed 18092.58 20519.45 30914.35 30098.24 29255.87 
Cotton 9300.00 9419.07 12195.51 12233.92 12260.63 
Sugar 11913.14 9375.60 14334.79 16456.97 7262.70 
Alcohol 23.22 25.35 34.60 38.12 41.78 
Fuel 14.44 14.44 14.44 14.44 14.44 
Ethanol       33.00 93.41 
Molasses   3348.78 5327.71 6080.71 18853.58 
            
Production (1000 MT)           
Rice 78133.89 75011.00 87872.00 84701.00 83081.00 
Wheat 66608.26 65749.00 96314.00 91858.00 85587.00 
Sugarcane 7240.00 8528.00 7996.00 7707.00 8168.00 
Sorghum 12437.01 13042.00 17554.00 17213.00 14650.00 
Groundnut 7506.51 7972.00 8452.00 8300.00 7875.00 
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Table B.1 (cont.) 
 
Rapeseed 2767.40 2656.00 2733.00 2828.00 2926.00 
Soy 6770.39 6528.00 12280.00 12247.00 12224.00 
Sugarcane  237100.00 243018.00 315354.00 400560.00 486840.00 
Cane for sugar 237100.00 243018.00 315354.00 279811.00 426465.00 
Cane for ethanol       120749.00 60375.00 
Sugar  12319.15 13005.00 16876.00 14974.00 22822.00 
Alcohol (1000 liters) 1267255.85 1203858.00 1562191.00 1386119.00 0.00 
Ethanol (1000 liters) 0.00 0.00   4447680.00 4447680.00 
Molasses ethanol (1000 
liters)       0.00 2223840.00 
Sugarcane ethanol (1000 
liters       4447680.00 2223840.00 
Molasses for alcohol   5627.00 7301.00 6478.00   
Molasses for ethanol     0.00 0.00 9874.00 
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Table B.2: State Level Results 
Haryana 
2004 
Observed 
Model 
2004 
2017 no 
blend 
2017 20% 
blend 
2017 50% 
molasses  
Ricekn 2 2 1 1 1 
Riceki 1028 1048 651 651 619 
Ricern 0 0 0 0 0 
Riceri 0 0 0 0 0 
RICE TOTAL 1030 1050 652 652 620 
Wheatn 23 0 0 0 0 
Wheati 2297 2300 3611 3611 3538 
WHEAT TOTAL 2320 2300 3611 3611 3538 
Sugarcanen 1 1 1 1 0 
Sugarcanei 129 129 82 82 114 
SUGARCANE TOTAL 130 130 83 83 114 
Sorghumkn 27 24 17 17 16 
Sorghumki 73 65 46 46 44 
Sorghumrn 0 0 0 0 0 
Sorghumri 0 0 0 0 0 
SORGHUM TOTAL 100 89 63 63 60 
Cornkn 6 7 4 4 4 
Cornki 10 10 6 6 6 
Cornrn   0       
Cornri   0 0 0 0 
CORN TOTAL 16 17 10 10 10 
Groundnutkn 2 4 1 1 1 
Groundnutki 0 0 0 0 0 
Groundnutrn   0       
Groundnutri   0       
GROUNDNUT TOTAL 2 4 1 1 1 
Rapeseedn 171 125 138 138 103 
Rapeseedi 529 583 429 429 318 
RAPESEED TOTAL 700 708 567 567 421 
Cottonn 4 4 2 2 2 
Cottoni 616 580 390 390 371 
COTTON TOTAL 620 584 392 392 373 
Soyn 0 0 0 0 0 
Soyi 0 0 0 0 0 
SOY TOTAL 0 0 0 0 0 
WATER USE Total (1000 ha 
cms) 162386.21 162428.93 175135.81 175135.81 175204.38 
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Table B.2 (cont.) 
Uttar Pradesh 
2004 
Observed 
Model 
2004 
2017 no 
blend 
2017 20% 
blend 
2017 50% 
molasses  
Ricekn 1591 1455 0 0 0 
Riceki 3749 3427 3820 2558 2978 
Ricern 0 0 0 0 0 
Riceri 0 0 0 0 0 
RICE TOTAL 5340 4882 3820 2558 2978 
Wheatn 270 273 0 0 0 
Wheati 8730 8828 8132 6422 5009 
WHEAT TOTAL 9000 9101 8132 6422 5009 
Sugarcanen 205 0 0 0 0 
Sugarcanei 1746 1968 2927 3526 3679 
SUGARCANE TOTAL 1951 1968 2927 3526 3679 
Sorghumkn 246 0 0 0 0 
Sorghumki 2 2 159 120 139 
Sorghumrn 0 228 0 0 0 
Sorghumri 0 0 0 0 0 
SORGHUM TOTAL 248 230 159 120 139 
Cornkn 612 548 406 292 340 
Cornki 268 241 178 128 149 
Cornrn 0 0 0 0 0 
Cornri 0 0 0 0 0 
CORN TOTAL 880 789 584 420 489 
Groundnutkn 79 80 61 38 44 
Groundnutki 1 1 1 1 0 
Groundnutrn 0 0 0 0 0 
Groundnutri 0 0 0 0 0 
GROUNDNUT TOTAL 80 81 62 39 44 
Rapeseedn 456 475 0 0 0 
Rapeseedi 364 379 553 392 456 
RAPESEED TOTAL 820 854 553 392 456 
Cottonn 0 0.065 0 0 0 
Cottoni 6 5 4 3 3 
COTTON TOTAL 6 5.065 4 3 3 
Soyn 9 6 6 4 5 
Soyi 0 0 0 0 0 
SOY TOTAL 9 6 6 4 5 
WATER USE Total (1000 ha 
cms) 453582.37 453622.01 488802.725 417863.23 400418.775 
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Table B.2 (cont.) 
Maharashtra 
2004 
Observed 
Model 
2004 
2017 no 
blend 
2017 20% 
blend 
2017 50% 
molasses  
Ricekn 1088 1088 975 915 756 
Riceki 432 432 387 363 300 
Ricern 0 0 0 0 0 
Riceri 0 0 0 0 0 
RICE TOTAL 1520 1520 1362 1278 1056 
Wheatn 300 300 0 0 349 
Wheati 460 460 111 233 534 
WHEAT TOTAL 760 760 111 233 883 
Sugarcanen 0 0 0 0 0 
Sugarcanei 320 320 47 546 903 
SUGARCANE TOTAL 320 320 47 546 903 
Sorghumkn 4260 4260 622 887 2436 
Sorghumki 500 500 73 104 286 
Sorghumrn 0 0 0 0 0 
Sorghumri 0 0 0 0 0 
SORGHUM TOTAL 4760 4760 695 991 2722 
Cornkn 359 359 183 105 455 
Cornki 71 0 36 36 0 
Cornrn 0 0 0 0 0 
Cornri 0 71 0 21 90 
CORN TOTAL 430 430 219 162 545 
Groundnutkn 315 315 273 59 238 
Groundnutki 135 135 117 25 102 
Groundnutrn 0 0 0 0 0 
Groundnutri 0 0 0 0 0 
GROUNDNUT TOTAL 450 450 390 84 340 
Rapeseedn 8 5 0 0 6 
Rapeseedi 8 11 2 3 6 
RAPESEED TOTAL 16 16 2 3 12 
Cottonn 2724 2724 0 0 2087 
Cottoni 116 116 415 638 89 
COTTON TOTAL 2840 2840 415 638 2176 
Soyn 2079 2079 0 0 2173 
Soyi 21 21 1835 1804 22 
SOY TOTAL 2100 2100 1835 1804 2195 
WATER USE Total (1000 ha 
cms) 127813.69 127847.44 110291.37 173409.93 172747.16 
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Table B.2 (cont.) 
Andhra Pradesh 
2004 
Observed 
Model 
2004 
2017 no 
blend 
2017 20% 
blend 
2017 50% 
molasses  
Ricekn 148 0 179 179 0 
Riceki 2942 2750 3557 3557 3251 
Ricern 0 0 0 0 0 
Riceri 0 0 0 0 0 
RICE TOTAL 3090 2750 3736 3736 3251 
Wheatn 5 0 5 5 0 
Wheati 4 11 5 5 8 
WHEAT TOTAL 9 11 10 10 8 
Sugarcanen 15 0 0 0 0 
Sugarcanei 195 230 218 218 297 
SUGARCANE TOTAL 210 230 218 218 297 
Sorghumkn 457 0 0 0 0 
Sorghumki 43 0 0 0 0 
Sorghumrn 0 0 0 0 0 
Sorghumri 0 570 462 462 313 
SORGHUM TOTAL 500 570 462 462 313 
Cornkn 447 135 0 0 0 
Cornki 213 391 0 0 0 
Cornrn 0 0 0 0 0 
Cornri 0 0 715 715 654 
CORN TOTAL 660 526 715 715 654 
Groundnutkn 1584 1266 1623 1623 1335 
Groundnutki 256 204 262 262 215 
Groundnutrn 0 0 0 0 0 
Groundnutri 0 0 0 0 0 
GROUNDNUT TOTAL 1840 1470 1885 1885 1550 
Rapeseedn 4 3 6 6 4 
Rapeseedi 0 0 0 0 0 
RAPESEED TOTAL 4 3 6 6 4 
Cottonn 1180 803 990 990 0 
Cottoni 0 0 0 0 978 
COTTON TOTAL 1180 803 990 990 978 
Soyn 77 40 89 89 73 
Soyi 3 1 3 3 3 
SOY TOTAL 80 41 92 92 76 
WATER USE Total (1000 ha 
cms) 381316.07 381284.57 479265.11 479265.11 479151.37 
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Table B.2 (cont.) 
Karnataka 
2004 
Observed 
Model 
2004 
2017 no 
blend 
2017 20% 
blend 
2017 50% 
molasses  
Ricekn 380 380 0 315 360 
Riceki 930 930 801 772 881 
Ricern 0 0 0 0 0 
Riceri 0 0 0 0 0 
RICE TOTAL 1310 1310 801 1087 1241 
Wheatn 121 121 0 106 127 
Wheati 119 119 150 104 125 
WHEAT TOTAL 240 240 150 210 252 
Sugarcanen 0 0 0 0 0 
Sugarcanei 170 170 125 211 397 
SUGARCANE TOTAL 170 170 125 211 397 
Sorghumkn 0 262 0 0 664 
Sorghumki 0 154 1951 1687 1120 
Sorghumrn 1506 1244 0 0 0 
Sorghumri 154 0 0 0 0 
SORGHUM TOTAL 1660 1660 1951 1687 1784 
Cornkn 517 517 0 0 0 
Cornki 333 0 1061 1079 625 
Cornrn 0 0 0 0 0 
Cornri 0 333 0 0 0 
CORN TOTAL 850 850 1061 1079 625 
Groundnutkn 778 0 457 583 675 
Groundnutki 192 0 113 144 167 
Groundnutrn 0 778 0 0 0 
Groundnutri 0 192 0 0 0 
GROUNDNUT TOTAL 970 970 570 727 842 
Rapeseedn 6 6 3 4 5 
Rapeseedi 0 0 0 0 0 
RAPESEED TOTAL 6 6 3 4 5 
Cottonn 369 369 0 0 331 
Cottoni 151 151 291 341 136 
COTTON TOTAL 520 520 291 341 467 
Soyn 118 118 0 0 40 
Soyi 42 42 87 98 14 
SOY TOTAL 160 160 87 98 54 
WATER USE Total (1000 ha 
cms) 156755.74 156755.74 211471.07 211559.78 211439.84 
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Table B.2 (cont.) 
Tamil Nadu 
2004 
Observed 
Model 
2004 
2017 no 
blend 
2017 20% 
blend 
2017 50% 
molasses  
Ricekn 140 0 0 0 0 
Riceki 1730 693 1634 1634 1041 
Ricern 0 127 0 0 0 
Riceri 0 880 0 0 0 
RICE TOTAL 1870 1700 1634 1634 1041 
Wheatn 0 0 0 0 0 
Wheati 0 0 0 0 0 
WHEAT TOTAL 0 0 0 0 0 
Sugarcanen 0 0 0 0 0 
Sugarcanei 230 280 388 388 434 
SUGARCANE TOTAL 230 280 388 388 434 
Sorghumkn 0 281 0 0 0 
Sorghumki 0 26 255 255 212 
Sorghumrn 350 23 0 0 0 
Sorghumri 30 0 0 0 0 
SORGHUM TOTAL 380 330 255 255 212 
Cornkn 132 52 0 0 0 
Cornki 58 69 167 167 106 
Cornrn 0 0 0 0 0 
Cornri 0 0 0 0 0 
CORN TOTAL 190 121 167 167 106 
Groundnutkn 421 0 0 0 0 
Groundnutki 199 82 0 0 0 
Groundnutrn 0 0 0 0 0 
Groundnutri 0 468 538 538 345 
GROUNDNUT TOTAL 620 550 538 538 345 
Rapeseedn 0 0 0 0 0 
Rapeseedi 0 0 0 0 0 
RAPESEED TOTAL 0 0 0 0 0 
Cottonn 72 50 0 0 0 
Cottoni 58 40 87 87 72 
COTTON TOTAL 130 90 87 87 72 
Soyn 1 1 1 1 1 
Soyi 0 0 0 0 0 
SOY TOTAL 1 1 1 1 1 
WATER USE Total (1000 ha 
cms) 239947.02 239952 269786.88 269786.88 195446.18 
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Table B.2 (cont.) 
Bihar 
2004 
Observed 
Model 
2004 
2017 no 
blend 
2017 20% 
blend 
2017 50% 
molasses  
Ricekn 1395 1363 0 0 1513 
Riceki 1725 1757 1409 1409 2077 
Ricern 0 0 0 0 0 
Riceri 0 0 0 0 0 
RICE TOTAL 3120 3120 1409 1409 3590 
Wheatn 150 150 206 0 161 
Wheati 1880 1880 2584 2791 2009 
WHEAT TOTAL 2030 2030 2790 2791 2170 
Sugarcanen 74 74 0 0 0 
Sugarcanei 26 26 45 45 190 
SUGARCANE TOTAL 100 100 45 45 190 
Sorghumkn 2 0 1 1 4 
Sorghumki 0 0.036 0 0 0 
Sorghumrn 0 2 0 0 0 
Sorghumri 0 0 0 0 0 
SORGHUM TOTAL 2 2.036 1 1 4 
Cornkn 260 0 306 306 111 
Cornki 350 195 401 401 149 
Cornrn 0 260 0 0 0 
Cornri 0 155 9 9 0 
CORN TOTAL 610 610 716 716 260 
Groundnutkn 0 0 0 0 0 
Groundnutki 0 0 0 0 0 
Groundnutrn 0 0 0 0 0 
Groundnutri 0 0 0 0   
GROUNDNUT TOTAL 0 0 0 0 0 
Rapeseedn 48 0 0 0 0 
Rapeseedi 32 80 36 36 90 
RAPESEED TOTAL 80 80 36 36 90 
Cottonn 0 0 0 0 0 
Cottoni 0 0 0 0   
COTTON TOTAL 0 0 0 0 0 
Soyn 0 0 0 0   
Soyi 0 0 0 0 0 
SOY TOTAL 0 0 0 0 0 
WATER USE Total (1000 ha 
cms) 179089.83 181822.28 179118.685 184902.265 209999.41 
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Table B.2 (cont.) 
Punjab 
2004 
Observed 
Model 
2004 
2017 no 
blend 
2017 20% 
blend 
2017 50% 
molasses  
Ricekn 19 18 10 9 8 
Riceki 2631 2622 1425 1294 1178 
Ricern 0 0 0 0 0 
Riceri 0 0 0 0 0 
RICE TOTAL 2650 2640 1435 1303 1186 
Wheatn 70 32 96 98 95 
Wheati 3410 3438 4709 4825 4675 
WHEAT TOTAL 3480 3470 4805 4923 4770 
Sugarcanen 3 3 1 2 4 
Sugarcanei 87 77 40 43 103 
SUGARCANE TOTAL 90 80 41 45 107 
Sorghumkn 0 0 0 0 0 
Sorghumki 0 0 0 0 0 
Sorghumrn 0 0 0 0 0 
Sorghumri 0 0 0 0 0 
SORGHUM TOTAL 0 0 0 0 0 
Cornkn 59 59 64 65 27 
Cornki 91 89 98 99 41 
Cornrn 0 0 0 0 0 
Cornri 0 0 0 0 0 
CORN TOTAL 150 148 162 164 68 
Groundnutkn 4 3 2 2 2 
Groundnutki 0 0 0 0 0 
Groundnutrn 0 0 0 0 0 
Groundnutri 0 0 0 0 0 
GROUNDNUT TOTAL 4 3 2 2 2 
Rapeseedn 5 4 2 2 2 
Rapeseedi 55 45 25 25 25 
RAPESEED TOTAL 60 49 27 27 27 
Cottonn 411 449 188 202 184 
Cottoni 99 108 45 49 44 
COTTON TOTAL 510 557 233 251 228 
Soyn 0 0 0 0 0 
Soyi 0 0 0 0 0 
SOY TOTAL 0 0 0 0 0 
WATER USE Total (1000 ha 
cms) 224818.35 223865.37 215661.03 215623.57 215673.87 
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Table B.2 (cont.) 
Assam 
2004 
Observed 
Model 
2004 
2017 no 
blend 
2017 20% 
blend 
2017 50% 
molasses  
Ricekn 2185 0 312 0 0 
Riceki 195 1 0 0 0 
Ricern 0 2184 2459 2771 2772 
Riceri 0 194 248 248 248 
RICE TOTAL 2380 2379 3019 3019 3020 
Wheatn 60 60 31 31 58 
Wheati 0 0 0 0 0 
WHEAT TOTAL 60 60 31 31 58 
Sugarcanen 20 20 10 10 23 
Sugarcanei 0 0 0 0 0 
SUGARCANE TOTAL 20 20 10 10 23 
Sorghumkn 0 0 0 0 0 
Sorghumki 0 0 0 0 0 
Sorghumrn 0 0 0 0 0 
Sorghumri 0 0 0 0 0 
SORGHUM TOTAL 0 0 0 0 0 
Cornkn 19 18.788 10 10 17 
Cornki 0 0 0 0 0 
Cornrn 0 0 0 0 0 
Cornri 0 0 0 0 0 
CORN TOTAL 19 18.788 10 10 17 
Groundnutkn 0 0 0 0 0 
Groundnutki 0 0 0 0 0 
Groundnutrn 0 0 0 0 0 
Groundnutri 0 0 0 0 0 
GROUNDNUT TOTAL 0 0 0 0 0 
Rapeseedn 239 239 288 288 228 
Rapeseedi 1 1 2 2 1 
RAPESEED TOTAL 240 240 290 290 229 
Cottonn 1 0.989 1 1 1 
Cottoni 0 0 0 0 0 
COTTON TOTAL 1 0.989 1 1 1 
Soyn 0 0 0 0 0 
Soyi 0 0 0 0 0 
SOY TOTAL 0 0 0 0 0 
WATER USE Total (1000 ha 
cms) 13388.25 13388.25 17035.3 17035.3 17024.05 
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Table B.2 (cont.) 
Chattisgarh 
2004 
Observed 
Model 
2004 
2017 no 
blend 
2017 20% 
blend 
2017 50% 
molasses  
Ricekn 2659 2581 2594 2594 2578 
Riceki 1091 1059 1065 1065 1058 
Ricern 0 0 0 0 0 
Riceri 0 0 0 0 0 
RICE TOTAL 3750 3640 3659 3659 3636 
Wheatn 39 37 37 37 36 
Wheati 60 57 57 57 55 
WHEAT TOTAL 99 94 94 94 91 
Sugarcanen 0 0 0 0 0 
Sugarcanei 12 9 14 14 19 
SUGARCANE TOTAL 12 9 14 14 19 
Sorghumkn 7 8 7 7 5 
Sorghumki 1 1 1 1 1 
Sorghumrn 0 0 0 0 0 
Sorghumri 0 0 0 0 0 
SORGHUM TOTAL 8 9 8 8 6 
Cornkn 96 10 0 0 0 
Cornki 2 84 106 106 100 
Cornrn 0 0 0 0 0 
Cornri 0 0 0 0 0 
CORN TOTAL 98 94 106 106 100 
Groundnutkn 29 29 27 27 27 
Groundnutki 5 5 5 5 5 
Groundnutrn 0 0 0 0 0 
Groundnutri 0 0 0 0 0 
GROUNDNUT TOTAL 34 34 32 32 32 
Rapeseedn 31 0 0 0 0 
Rapeseedi 24 48 55 55 53 
RAPESEED TOTAL 55 48 55 55 53 
Cottonn 0 0 0 0 0 
Cottoni 0 0 0 0 0 
COTTON TOTAL 0 0 0 0 0 
Soyn 32 15 45 45 62 
Soyi 0 0 0 0 0 
SOY TOTAL 32 15 45 45 62 
WATER USE (ha cms) 53569.1 53582.36 54946.81 54946.81 54994.95 
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Table B.2 (cont.) 
Gujarat 
2004 
Observed 
Model 
2004 
2017 no 
blend 
2017 20% 
blend 
2017 50% 
molasses  
Ricekn 293 0 681 681 0 
Riceki 397 0 266 266 593 
Ricern 0 285 0 0 0 
Riceri 0 385 0 0 0 
RICE TOTAL 690 670 947 947 593 
Wheatn 91 0 0 0 0 
Wheati 639 570 1031 1031 887 
WHEAT TOTAL 730 570 1031 1031 887 
Sugarcanen 0 0 0 0 0 
Sugarcanei 200 184 193 193 286 
SUGARCANE TOTAL 200 184 193 193 286 
Sorghumkn 166 156 122 122 108 
Sorghumki 14 13 10 10 9 
Sorghumrn 0 0 0 0 0 
Sorghumri 0 0 0 0 0 
SORGHUM TOTAL 180 169 132 132 117 
Cornkn 429 423 370 370 76 
Cornki 31 30 27 27 271 
Cornrn 0 0 0 0 0 
Cornri 0 0 0 0 0 
CORN TOTAL 460 453 397 397 347 
Groundnutkn 1850 11 633 633 941 
Groundnutki 150 0 0 0 115 
Groundnutrn 0 1760 1427 1427 473 
Groundnutri 0 144 167 167 0 
GROUNDNUT TOTAL 2000 1915 2227 2227 1529 
Rapeseedn 6 0 0 0 0 
Rapeseedi 284 269 300 300 261 
RAPESEED TOTAL 290 269 300 300 261 
Cottonn 1125 829 0 0 0 
Cottoni 785 956 2097 2097 1819 
COTTON TOTAL 1910 1785 2097 2097 1819 
Soyn 27 13 41 41 35 
Soyi 0 0 0 0 0 
SOY TOTAL 27 13 41 41 35 
WATER USE Total (1000 ha 
cms) 111315.66 111239.13 163453.66 163453.66 182436.35 
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Table B.2 (cont.) 
MadhyaPradesh 
2004 
Observed 
Model 
2004 
2017 no 
blend 
2017 20% 
blend 
2017 50% 
molasses  
Ricekn 1424 1459 1079 1079 1079 
Riceki 196 201 148 148 148 
Ricern 0 0 0 0 0 
Riceri 0 0 0 0 0 
RICE TOTAL 1620 1660 1227 1227 1227 
Wheatn 898 779 160 160 160 
Wheati 3242 2911 2976 2976 2976 
WHEAT TOTAL 4140 3690 3136 3136 3136 
Sugarcanen 0 0.146 0 0 0 
Sugarcanei 50 60 38 38 38 
SUGARCANE TOTAL 50 60.146 38 38 38 
Sorghumkn 660 580 500 500 500 
Sorghumki 0 0 0 0 0 
Sorghumrn 0 0 0 0 0 
Sorghumri 0 0 0 0 0 
SORGHUM TOTAL 660 580 500 500 500 
Cornkn 883 687 0 0 0 
Cornki 17 173 682 682 682 
Cornrn 0 0 0 0 0 
Cornri 0 0 0 0 0 
CORN TOTAL 900 860 682 682 682 
Groundnutkn 184 184 139 139 139 
Groundnutki 16 16 12 12 12 
Groundnutrn 0 0 0 0 0 
Groundnutri 0 0 0 0 0 
GROUNDNUT TOTAL 200 200 151 151 151 
Rapeseedn 359 0 0 0 0 
Rapeseedi 331 810 523 523 523 
RAPESEED TOTAL 690 810 523 523 523 
Cottonn 509 544 385 385 385 
Cottoni 71 76 54 54 54 
COTTON TOTAL 580 620 439 439 439 
Soyn 4468 4239 6635 6635 6635 
Soyi 22 21 33 33 33 
SOY TOTAL 4490 4260 6668 6668 6668 
WATER USE Total (1000 ha 
cms) 121045.35 120992.67 124294.74 124294.74 124294.74 
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Table B.2 (cont.) 
Orissa 
2004 
Observed 
Model 
2004 
2017 no 
blend 
2017 20% 
blend 
2017 50% 
molasses  
Ricekn 2566 11 3096 3096 3096 
Riceki 1904 0 2298 2298 2298 
Ricern 0 2487 0 0 0 
Riceri 0 1854 0 0 0 
RICE TOTAL 4470 4352 5394 5394 5394 
Wheatn 0 0 0 0 0 
Wheati 16 15 9 9 9 
WHEAT TOTAL 16 15 9 9 9 
Sugarcanen 0 0 0 0 0 
Sugarcanei 20 14 11 11 11 
SUGARCANE TOTAL 20 14 11 11 11 
Sorghumkn 10 11 5 5 5 
Sorghumki 0 0 0 0 0 
Sorghumrn 0 0 0 0 0 
Sorghumri 0 0 0 0 0 
SORGHUM TOTAL 10 11 5 5 5 
Cornkn 181 0 0 0 0 
Cornki 4 169 0 0 0 
Cornrn 0 0 0 0 0 
Cornri 0 0 233 233 233 
CORN TOTAL 185 169 233 233 233 
Groundnutkn 56 0 30 30 30 
Groundnutki 34 0 18 18 18 
Groundnutrn 0 45 0 0 0 
Groundnutri 0 27 0 0 0 
GROUNDNUT TOTAL 90 72 48 48 48 
Rapeseedn 57 52 0 0 0 
Rapeseedi 53 48 59 59 59 
RAPESEED TOTAL 110 100 59 59 59 
Cottonn 46 36 25 25 25 
Cottoni 0 0 0 0 0 
COTTON TOTAL 46 36 25 25 25 
Soyn 0 0 0 0 0 
Soyi 0 0 0 0 0 
SOY TOTAL 0 0 0 0 0 
WATER USE Total  91737.73 91717.7 112548.97 112548.97 112548.97 
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Table B.2 (cont.) 
Rajasthan 
2004 
Observed 
Model 
2004 
2017 no 
blend 
2017 20% 
blend 
2017 50% 
molasses  
Ricekn 43 43 0 0 0 
Riceki 58 58 107 107 107 
Ricern 0 0 0 0 0 
Riceri 0 0 0 0 0 
RICE TOTAL 101 101 107 107 107 
Wheatn 26 26 0 0 22 
Wheati 1984 1984 2120 2120 2120 
WHEAT TOTAL 2010 2010 2120 2120 2142 
Sugarcanen 0 0.263 0 0 0 
Sugarcanei 6 6 8 8 8 
SUGARCANE TOTAL 6 6.263 8 8 8 
Sorghumkn 567 567 530 530 530 
Sorghumki 3 3 62 62 62 
Sorghumrn 0 0 0 0 0 
Sorghumri 0 0 0 0 0 
SORGHUM TOTAL 570 570 592 592 592 
Cornkn 1011 1011 0 0 0 
Cornki 29 29 1005 1005 1005 
Cornrn 0 0 0 0 0 
Cornri 0 0 0 0 0 
CORN TOTAL 1040 1040 1005 1005 1005 
Groundnutkn 120 120 120 120 120 
Groundnutki 170 170 170 170 170 
Groundnutrn 0 0 0 0 0 
Groundnutri 0 0 0 0 0 
GROUNDNUT TOTAL 290 290 290 290 290 
Rapeseedn 655 655 0 0 0 
Rapeseedi 3025 3025 3670 3670 3670 
RAPESEED TOTAL 3680 3680 3670 3670 3670 
Cottonn 13 13 14 14 14 
Cottoni 427 427 458 458 458 
COTTON TOTAL 440 440 472 472 472 
Soyn 574 574 0 0 0 
Soyi 46 46 744 744 744 
SOY TOTAL 620 620 744 744 744 
WATER USE Total  126108.39 126108.39 176916.72 176916.72 176916.72 
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Table B.2 (cont.) 
WestBengal 
2004 
Observed 
Model 
2004 
2017 no 
blend 
2017 20% 
blend 
2017 50% 
molasses  
Ricekn 2832 326 0 0 0 
Riceki 2948 434 0 0 0 
Ricern 0 2479 3493 3480 3453 
Riceri 0 2485 3636 3623 3594 
RICE TOTAL 5780 5724 7129 7103 7047 
Wheatn 82 76 40 44 67 
Wheati 318 295 154 172 261 
WHEAT TOTAL 400 371 194 216 328 
Sugarcanen 10 9 5 5 9 
Sugarcanei 10 9 5 6 9 
SUGARCANE TOTAL 20 18 10 11 18 
Sorghumkn 2 1 1 1 1 
Sorghumki 0 0 0 0 0 
Sorghumrn 0 0 0 0 0 
Sorghumri 0 0 0 0 0 
SORGHUM TOTAL 2 1 1 1 1 
Cornkn 43 60 25 23 0 
Cornki 7 11 4 4 61 
Cornrn 0 0 0 0 0 
Cornri 0 0 0 0 0 
CORN TOTAL 50 71 29 27 61 
Groundnutkn 0 0 0 0 0 
Groundnutki 0 0 0 0 0 
Groundnutrn 0 0 0 0 0 
Groundnutri 0 0 0 0 0 
GROUNDNUT TOTAL 0 0 0 0 0 
Rapeseedn 256 437 0 0 0 
Rapeseedi 204 0 538 565 381 
RAPESEED TOTAL 460 437 538 565 381 
Cottonn 1 4 0 1 4 
Cottoni 0 0 0 0 0 
COTTON TOTAL 1 4 0 1 4 
Soyn 0 0 0 0 0 
Soyi 0 0 0 0 0 
SOY TOTAL 0 0 0 0 0 
WATER USE Total  214695.72 209734.4 260436.36 260465.53 260375.69 
Source: 2004 Observed Acreage: Agricultural Statistics at a Glance2006 Ministry of Agriculture GOI 
http://dacnet.nic.in/eands/At_A_Glance/pcrops.html 
